01_PARRY (DO NOT DELETE)

3/7/2014 7:26 PM

WHAT IS THE GROTIAN TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW?
JOHN T. PARRY*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.

3.

4.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................300
GROTIUS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
RELATIONS ...................................................................................306
2.1. Grotius as the Foundation of Liberal Internationalism .........306
2.1.1. Hersch Lauterpacht .....................................................306
2.1.2. Mary Ellen O’Connell .................................................312
2.2. Variations: Grotius as Essential to a Liberal World Order ...315
2.2.1. Grotian Moments ........................................................316
2.2.2. Grotius and the Middle Path .......................................318
2.3. Dissents: Grotius as Authoritarian, Realist, or Hobbesian ...320
GROTIUS IN HISTORY AND THE RIGHTS OF
WAR AND PEACE WITHOUT TRADITION ...................................324
3.1. Hugo Grotius .........................................................................325
3.1.1. Background and Early Career ....................................325
3.1.2. The Law of Prize.........................................................327
3.1.3. Lobbying, Diplomacy, and the Free Sea .....................334
3.1.4. Pacta Sunt Servanda ..................................................337
3.1.5. Revolt and Exile .........................................................341
3.2. The Rights of War and Peace .................................................349
3.2.1. Lauterpacht’s
Description
of
Grotius’s
Arguments .................................................................349
3.2.2. Grotius’s Arguments in the Rights of War and
Peace ...........................................................................351
3.3. Summing Up .........................................................................363
WHAT TO DO WITH GROTIUS .....................................................366

* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law
School. I am grateful for the comments of Michael Scharf and of participants in
the 2012 ASIL-ESIL workshop on Transnational Debates in Legal Theory,
particularly Patrick Capps and Tim Sellers, as well as for the research assistance of
Chris Gunn, Greg Harvey, and Jenny Logan.

299

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

01_PARRY (DO NOT DELETE)

3/7/2014 7:26 PM

300

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:2

4.1. Inventing a Tradition ............................................................366
4.2. Reverse Engineering? Surveying the Options ................369
4.2.1. Nothing ......................................................................369
4.2.2. Abandon Grotius to History ......................................370
4.2.3. Recognize Grotius as a Transitional Figure ..............371
4.2.4. Grotius as Distant Architect ......................................373
4.2.5. Grotius as International Lawyer? ..............................374
1.

INTRODUCTION

In The Power and Purpose of International Law, Mary Ellen
O’Connell confronts Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner’s version of
the familiar claim that international law does not create obligations
that are binding and enforceable in their own right, and that it is
primarily a reflection of the rational efforts of states to pursue their
own interests.1 She begins by putting their argument into “a
history of scholars attempting to free sovereigns or sovereign states
from the rules of the world community.”2 At the root of this
history sits Niccolo Machiavelli, who propounded the theory that
“sovereigns are above the law.”3 Alongside Machiavelli is Thomas
Hobbes, the great but controversial theorist of human nature and
sovereignty,4 with Emmerich de Vattel playing a more ambiguous
but ultimately negative role.5 John Austin, Carl Schmitt, and Hans
Morgenthau round out the main characters in this history of
sovereign disregard for—and sometimes denial of—international
law.6
O’Connell uses a different historical narrative to frame her own
claims. First, she invokes Hugo Grotius, “the seventeenth-century
Dutch scholar and diplomat credited with founding modern

1 See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 2-3 (2008). For
Goldsmith and Posner’s summary of their claims, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-17 (2005).
2 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 3.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 5, 27.
5 Id. at 36-37.
Cf. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 7 (rev. ed. 2011) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF LAW] (referring to Vattel’s “elegant manner of evasion” on
international arbitration of disputes).
6 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 4, 6.
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international law.”7 According to O’Connell, “[i]n the Grotian
worldview, law is as present and important for the rulers of
nations in their relations as for individuals within nations. Grotius
saw law for nations as a moral imperative.”8 Second, she
highlights Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the great twentieth-century
scholars and jurists of international law and author of the classic
essay, The Grotian Tradition in International Law9: “As Hersch
Lauterpacht put it, for Grotius, ‘the hall-mark of wisdom for a ruler
is to take account not only of the good of the nation committed to
his care, but of the whole human race.’”10 Later in the book,
O’Connell credits Lauterpacht not only with “reviving the Grotian
tradition of natural law” but also with describing the several
“‘features’ of the Grotian tradition that were essential aspects of
postwar international law.”11 Other contemporary theorists whom
she identifies as advancing at least some Grotian ideals are Hans
Kelsen, Louis Henkin, and Thomas Franck.12
For his part, Lauterpacht argued that the Grotian tradition is
central to international law, that by extension international law is a
moral project, and that realism is peripheral to and destructive of
it.13 The Grotian tradition as articulated by Lauterpacht and
O’Connell thus posits the moral necessity of international law,
contends that it has binding force, and provides a normative
perspective for scholarly engagement with these ideas and goals.
And, as Michael Scharf recently observed, “the ‘Grotian tradition’
has come to symbolize the advent of the modern international legal
regime, characterized by a community of states operating under
binding rules, which arose from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.”14
Id. at 3.
Id.
9 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1 (1946) [hereinafter Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition].
10 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 3-4 (quoting Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition,
supra note 9, at 31).
11 Id. at 53.
12 Id. at 6-9.
13 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 51.
14 MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 4 (2013). Scharf focuses
on contemporary perceptions, not historical accuracy. See id. at 26 (“That the
legend suffers from historical inaccuracy does not diminish its usefulness as a
metaphor for critical turning points in international law and relations.”).
7
8

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

01_PARRY (DO NOT DELETE)

302

3/7/2014 7:26 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:2

Arrayed against these views, once again, are the “realists,” who
conceive of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature,
ungoverned by law, in which force, self-interest, and pragmatism
are the primary tools.15
This article critically examines the claims that (1) there is a
meaningfully definable “Grotian tradition in international law”
that stretches from the 1600s to today, and (2) any tradition that
begins with Grotius should best be interpreted to provide concrete
and specific support for the goals of contemporary liberal
internationalism (or other non-realist schools of thought).16

15 Goldsmith and Posner deny they are “realists,” which is a label they
associate with international relations theory, and they insist international law has
an important role in international affairs. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1,
at 16, 180 (distinguishing traditional “realism” from their research agenda). They
also emphasize their use of rational choice theory as an instrumental approach.
Id. at 7-10, 14-17. Yet they appear to conceive of international law as subservient
to and in the service of international relations, which creates at least a partial
alignment between them and realists. See Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the
Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH
& POSNER, supra note 1) (“The vision of international law that Goldsmith and
Posner espouse, though newly dressed up in the trappings of rational choice
theory and econometric analysis, is at bottom just the same old realist vision.”);
Edward T. Swaine, Restoring (and Risking) Interest in International Law, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 259, 259 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1) (quoting the
book’s conception of international law as “binding and robust, but only when it is
rational for states to comply with it,” and asserting this is “a fine line to walk, and
though the authors do so with great skill, their ambivalence is apparent”).
16 I use “liberal internationalism” as rough shorthand for the general package
of positions that Lauterpacht, O’Connell, and many others have advanced.
Despite his tone, Walter Russell Mead’s description is useful:

Liberal internationalists . . . believe, passionately, that only international
law can save us from chaos, violence and, hopefully, war. A strong body
of international law, enforced by international courts and obeyed by
national governments is the way to make war less likely and less
dreadful when it occurs; it can also deter torture, human rights violations
and a whole host of other bad things. Liberal internationalists want the
world to become a more orderly and law abiding place. Ideally many
would like the United Nations or some other international organization
to evolve into something a little bit like a world government: the
European Union on a global scale.
But failing that, liberal
internationalists would like to see better enforcement mechanisms for
documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They would
like the ‘laws of war’ to become ever more clearly codified and ever more
effectively enforced. They look to the day when power shifts from
national governments to international bureaucracies and institutions.
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Grotius’s ideas, as articulated most fully in his masterwork, The
Rights of War and Peace,17 do not provide an obvious basis for a
continually relevant tradition in the form described by
Lauterpacht, O’Connell, and other writers. Nor do his ideas
provide much more than spotty support for contemporary ideas of
pacifism, human rights, and limited national sovereignty.18
To the extent it is important to situate Grotius, his life and
writings put him firmly within Antony Anghie’s genealogy of
international law developing hand-in-hand with colonialism and
imperialism—although Anghie’s account pays little attention to
Grotius.19 Outside of legal studies, historians and theorists
Walter Russell Mead, Liberal Internationalism: The Twilight of a Dream, THE AM.
INTEREST (Apr. 1, 2010), http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/
04/01/liberal-internationalism-the-twilight-of-a-dream/.
17 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE]
(1625). Grotius wrote in Latin, but the book was quickly translated into several
languages, and an influential French edition appeared in 1724. I use the 1738
English translation of the French edition, which is the edition English and
American readers typically used well into the nineteenth century. See Richard
Tuck, Introduction, in 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE x-xi
(Richard Tuck ed., 2005) (remarking that the 1738 edition is “very common” and
that copies of it were found in “most academic and private libraries of the
period”). If a Grotian tradition in Anglo-American writing on international law
extends further back than the mid-twentieth century, this translation is likely the
most appropriate. Note, as well, that commentators have questioned the 1925
translation published by the Carnegie Endowment. See Patrick Capps, Natural
Law and the Law of Nations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 62-63 (Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., 2011) (asserting the
Carnegie translations “leave[] us with a ‘very misleading picture’ about the nature
of the intellectual endeavour which these early writers on war and peace were
undertaking”).
18 Edward Keene makes a similar point, more in the context of international
relations theory:
Often without realizing it, the numerous scholars today who use
concepts like the ‘Westphalian system’, the ‘Grotian tradition’ and the
‘society of states’ . . . are therefore committing themselves to a peculiarly
narrow and twisted perspective on order in modern world politics. The
very idea of a society of states is itself something of a hybrid, and it is
quite incorrect to suppose, as so many do, that it accurately reflects a
Grotian tradition of thought about international political and legal order
that goes back to the dawn of the modern era in the seventeenth century.
EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALSIM AND
ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 38 (2002).
19 See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 224, 292-93 (2004) (noting the importance of self-defense in
Grotius’s work and recognizing Grotius wrote “several of his most important

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

01_PARRY (DO NOT DELETE)

304

3/7/2014 7:26 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:2

increasingly have recognized not only that Grotius was a person of
his times and a complex thinker, but also that he was an engaged
participant in the politics of the United Provinces.20 Those politics,
in turn, centered on questions of national sovereignty, identity, and
the role of religion, as well as on commercial and imperial
ambitions. As such, Grotius is certainly an apt figure for the
formative period of European statehood and of international law
as a European project—a period that encompasses, at its outer
reaches, the founding of the United States. His suitability as a
positive figurehead for a progressive contemporary vision of
international law is, however, more problematic.
To be sure, there is a longstanding tradition of advocating for
pacifism, human rights, and limited national sovereignty as critical
components of international law. There also has been a creative
tradition of engagement with Grotius’s ideas in fields outside
international law.21 These traditions are distinct from the idea of a
Grotian tradition in international law or international relations.
Even more, the link between Grotius and contemporary theories
about international law and relations is an invention.22 Put
somewhat differently, many of the ideas that Lauterpacht,
O’Connell, and other writers identify as the Grotian tradition did
not come from Grotius and did not emerge from a tradition of
direct engagement with his work. The Grotian tradition, in short,
is less about Grotius than it is about the ideas and goals of his postWorld War II interlocutors.
works as a justification for advancing [the] interests” of the Dutch East India
Company). A more recent essay recognizes Grotius’s greater significance for
post-colonial scholarship. See Antony Anghie, International Law in a Time of
Change: Should International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1315, 132122 (2011); see also infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing Anghie’s
more recent assessment of Grotius).
20 See generally MARTINE JULIA VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO
GROTIUS, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST
INDIES 1595-1615 (2006). See also JONATHAN ISRAEL, THE DUTCH REPUBLIC: ITS RISE,
GREATNESS, AND FALL 1477–1806 421–59 (1995) (discussing Grotius’s role in the
Oldenbarnevelt regime).
21 For example, Renée Jeffery argues there is a Grotian tradition “of thought
concerned with the relationship between law and morality.” RENÉE JEFFERY, HUGO
GROTIUS IN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT 140 (2006).
22 See infra Part 4.1 (analyzing the invention of the Grotian tradition and the
invention of traditions generally). Jeffery similarly explores the possibility of an
invented Grotian tradition in international relations. See, e.g., JEFFERY, supra note
21, at 17–26, 140–45.
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Why did post-World War II international law theorists invent
the Grotian tradition? There are at least three reasons. First is the
post-World War II effort to remake the international system.
Second is the desire to provide a historically situated theoretical
foundation for the ideas that arguably undergird that system.
Third is the utility of “purifying” Grotius’s ideas so as to be able to
claim not only that Grotius provides the necessary theoretical
foundation for the post-War order, but also that properly
understood, the foundation of that order—and by extension
international law itself—has always forwarded pacifism, human
rights, and an international rule of law as much or more than it has
accommodated a system of independent nation-states that pursue
their own interests.
If the Grotian tradition is invented, then perhaps the countertradition of realism is also invented.23 After all, contemporary
invocations of both positions typically seek to advance
contemporary ideological purposes that supposedly follow from
those positions, such as those I described above.24 Claiming that a
tradition or history is an invention—that it is, as Eric Hobsbawm
wrote, “factitious” instead of real or natural25—does not mean that
the ideologies behind such efforts are pernicious. Still, positing a
Grotians–realists dichotomy as the fundamental tension in
international law obscures the breadth of views among
contemporary scholars of international law. The related effort to
posit a realists–Grotians–idealists continuum in international
relations theory is similarly obfuscating.
I am not trying to attack O’Connell, Lauterpacht, or anyone else
for their interpretations of Grotius. Nor do I want to fuel
arguments against the existence or efficacy of international law.
But, I do mean to suggest that international lawyers and theorists
should not spend time searching for origins or creating historical
23 Thus, although I do not argue the point here, the versions of Hobbes and
Machiavelli advanced by self-styled Grotians are often acontextual and overly
simplified.
24 For a more critical but similar claim, see David Kennedy, A New Stream of
International Law Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (“[T]he discipline of
international public law, narratives of public law history and public law doctrine,
and even international institutions, seem structured as movements from imagined
origins through an expansive process towards a desired substantive goal.”).
25 Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION 2 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
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accounts that supposedly generate unique, foundational, or
overarching insights into and solutions for current debates. The
various positions associated with liberal internationalism and its
successors do not depend on valorizing a Grotian tradition of
natural law-based rules, and it makes little sense to judge
contemporary commentators by how close they come to a made-up
version of Grotius (or, for that matter, to a made-up version of
Machiavelli), particularly when few people easily pass (or fail) the
test. Whatever place remains for Grotius, it is something more
chastened, less foundational—and if useful at all, only in limited
ways.
2.

GROTIUS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
RELATIONS

2.1. Grotius as the Foundation of Liberal Internationalism
2.1.1. Hersch Lauterpacht
According to his son, Hersch Lauterpacht believed that his 1946
essay, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law”26 was
“probably the most important [article] that he ever wrote.”27 The
essay begins by admitting that Grotius’s work can be difficult to
interpret—that, for example, “we often look in vain [in The Rights of
War and Peace] for a statement as to what is the law governing the
matter.”28 He also noted that some writers have criticized Grotius
or his writing as “reactionary.”29
These observations did not deter Lauterpacht from arguing for
Grotius’s importance to the post-World War II international legal
order. Lauterpacht’s interpretation begins with a characterization
of Grotius himself: “not primarily a man of affairs,” he was “a
See generally Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9.
Elihu Lauterpacht, Editor’s Note to Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian
Tradition in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS
OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, VOLUME 2: THE LAW OF PEACE 307 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed.,
1975) (“From conversations which my father had with me, I know that he
regarded this article as probably the most important that he ever wrote. Certainly,
I can recall the immense amount of labour that he put into it.”). See also JEFFERY,
supra note 21, at 93 (noting, as well, Lauterpacht’s assessment).
28 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 5.
29 Id. at 14. Lauterpacht specifically mentioned Rousseau but dismissed his
criticisms as a “low level of vituperation.” Id. at 1. He never mentioned Kant.
26
27
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prodigy, almost a miracle, of learning,” a polemicist on religious
issues, and “a brilliant literary scholar.”30 His diplomatic career
“was merely a source of livelihood”31—although Lauterpacht also
noted the possibility that The Rights of War and Peace was “prepared
with an eye to diplomatic employment.”32 The general picture is of
a disinterested scholar who wrote out of disgust at the carnage of
the Thirty Years War and who sought to “humaniz[e] . . . the
conduct of war.”33 Further, Lauterpacht argued, Grotius’s work
contains “a unity and a consistency which transcend its evasions
and contradictions.”34 Finally, he insisted on the contrasts between
Grotius and Machiavelli, “the realist,” and between Grotius and
Hobbes, “the atheist.”35 Lauterpacht thus put readers on notice
that he would be advancing a comprehensive, authoritative, and
normatively attractive interpretation of Grotius.
Less clear is the extent to which Lauterpacht was also making a
more controversial historical claim about a continually operative,
dominant, and relatively unified tradition stretching from
Grotius’s day to 1946 and beyond. Though Grotius undoubtedly
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
32 Id. at 13.
33 Id. at 12. In the introduction or Prolegomena to The Rights of War and Peace,
Grotius wrote:
30
31

I had many and weighty Reasons inducing me to write a Treatise . . . . I
observed throughout the Christian World a Licentiousness in regard to
War, which even barbarous Nations ought to be ashamed of: a Running
to Arms upon very frivolous or rather no Occasions; which being once
taken up, there remained no longer any Reverence for Right, either
Divine or Human, just as if from that Time Men were authorized and
firmly resolved to commit all manner of Crimes without Restraint.
1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 106. Scholars typically
assume this is a reference to the Thirty Years War. But cf. JEFFERY, note 21, at 12–
13 (noting Grotius denied the war affected his reasoning). Grotius later wrote that
he sought “to convince authorities of the necessity to abstain from cruelty in
warfare . . . .” Henk J.M. Nellen, Hugo Grotius’s Political and Scholarly Activities in
the Light of His Correspondence, 26–28 GROTIANA 16, 28 (2005–07).
34 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 1.
35 Id. On Hobbes’s supposed atheism, see ROSS HARRISON, HOBBES, LOCKE,
AND CONFUSION’S MASTERPIECE: AN EXAMINATION OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 54 (2003), which describes the debate over Hobbes’s
religious beliefs, and Jeremy Waldron, Hobbes on Public Worship, in NOMOS XLVIII:
TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 31 (Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron eds., 2008),
which takes seriously the idea that religion was important to Hobbes for its own
sake as well as for its political implications.
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has been a significant figure, his importance has ebbed and flowed.
Renée Jeffery has argued, for example, that “by the middle of the
18th century . . . [his] popularity was experiencing a significant
decline.”36 If she is correct, then Lauterpacht’s essay is part of an
effort to revive Grotius, which weakens any claim that there was a
meaningful tradition during the interim period.37
Turning to the substance of Grotius’s writing, Lauterpacht
declared:
[T]he principal and characteristic features of De Jure Belli ac
Pacis are identical with the fundamental and persistent
problems of international law and . . . in nearly all of them
the teaching of Grotius has become identified with the
progression of international law to a true system of law
both in its legal and in its ethical content.38
Lauterpacht spent the rest of the essay identifying and
explaining these “principal and characteristic features,” and near
the end of the essay he summarized the principle features of The
Rights of War and Peace:
[T]he subjection of the totality of international relations to
the rule of law; the acceptance of the law of nature as an
independent source of international law; the affirmation of
the social nature of man as the basis of the law of nature;
the recognition of the essential identity of states and
individuals; the rejection of ‘reason of State’; the distinction
between just and unjust war; the doctrine of qualified
neutrality; the binding force of promises; the fundamental

36 Renée Jeffery, Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge, and the ‘Grotian
Tradition’ in 20th-Century International Relations, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 223, 223
(2006). The Rights of War and Peace was “‘reprinted or translated fifty times
between 1625 and 1758’, [but] in the following hundred years it would only be
published . . . twice.” Id. at 224 (citing Mark Weston Janis, American Versions of the
International Law of Christendom: Kent, Wheaton and the Grotian Tradition, 39 NETH.
INT’L L. REV. 37, 43 (1992); J.G. Starke, The Influence of Grotius Upon the Development
of International Law in the Eighteenth Century, in GROTIAN SOCIETY PAPERS 1972:
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 162, 163 (C.H. Alexandrowicz ed.,
1972)).
37 See id. at 229–34 (discussing the early twentieth century revival of Grotius
and natural law).
38 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 19.
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rights and freedoms of the individual; the idea of peace;
and the tradition of idealism and progress.39
These eleven ideas make up “what has here been called the Grotian
tradition in international law.”40
Four of these ideas—the importance of the law of nature, the
natural sociability of humans as the basis for the law of nature, a
commitment to human rights, and the goal of peace or pacifism—
deserve more discussion here because of their foundational role in
defining the Grotian tradition, both in its affirmative aspects and in
its differences from what Lauterpacht identifies as realism. Part
Three will consider the extent to which Lauterpacht’s articulation
of these ideas line up with Grotius’s writings on international law.
Lauterpacht admitted that “we are often at a loss as to the true
meaning which [Grotius] attaches to the law of nature.”41 But, he
argued, what Grotius meant to say is that “[t]he law of nature . . . is
the law which is most in conformity with the social nature of man
and the preservation of human society . . . .”42 After describing
different aspects of this law of nature, and further uncertainties—
such as the distressing possibility that on occasion Grotius’s
“conception of natural law approaches very much that of Hobbes’s
notion of the right of nature and the law of nature”43—Lauterpacht
concluded that, “[o]n the whole we are probably right in assuming
that the most frequent use of the notion of the law of nature by
Grotius is what we should describe as general principles of law
arrived at by way of a generalization and synthesis of the principal
systems of jurisprudence.”44 From there, Lauterpacht took care to
emphasize that, for Grotius, the law of nature was robust. It was:
[T]he ever-present source for supplementing the voluntary
law of nations, for judging its adequacy in the light of ethics
and reason, and for making the reader aware of the fact that
the will of states cannot be the exclusive or even, in the last
resort, the decisive source of the law of nations.45
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
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With respect to human sociability, Lauterpacht stressed the
importance of this issue for the content of international law:
It is a law of nature largely based on and deduced from the
nature of man as a being intrinsically moved by a desire for
social life, endowed with an ample measure of goodness,
altruism, and morality, and capable of acting on general
principles and of learning from experience. He admits that
man is an animal, but one different in kind from other
animals. That difference consists in his impelling desire for
society—not for society of any sort, but for peaceful and
organized life according to the measure of his intelligence.46
Lauterpacht further made clear that this desire for a strong
moral community demonstrated the essential difference between
Grotius and other writers—primarily Machiavelli and Hobbes—
whose skewed and dark views of human nature as “selfish, antisocial, and unable to learn from experience” led them into the
errors of realism.47
Lauterpacht did not mince words on the bedrock quality of this
distinction. The “pessimism” of realists leads them to conclude
that “the basis of political obligation is interest pure and simple”
and that “the idea of a sense of moral duty rising supreme over
desire and passion is a figment of imagination fatal alike to action
and to survival.”48 These views, he went on to say, are
[T]he typical realistic approach of contempt towards the
‘little breed’ of man. On that line of reasoning there is no
salvation for humanity but irrevocable subjection to an
order of effective force which, while indifferent to the
dignity of man, yet contrives to prevent his life from being
‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.49
“The approach of Grotius,” Lauterpacht concluded, “is
diametrically different” because of his continued faith in and
appeals to morality and reason as capable of triumphing “over

46
47
48
49

Id. at 24 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
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unbridled selfishness and passion, both within the state and in the
relations of states.”50
With respect to pacifism and human rights, Lauterpacht was
less detailed.
Initially, Grotius’s approach to rights is
“disillusioning,”51 but Lauterpacht argued it is more nuanced than
it first appears, and he noted several instances in which Grotius
appeared to define natural human rights.52 On war, Lauterpacht
asserted that “not the least important . . . aspect of the Grotian
tradition is his pacifism.”53 But, Lauterpacht’s actual discussion
required him to hedge. Despite Grotius’s articulation of the
circumstances in which a war can be just, and his admission that
the law of nature allowed “pronounced inhumanity” in the
conduct of war, Lauterpacht contended that, “[i]n general, there
breathes from the pages of De Jure Belli ac Pacis a disapproval,
amounting to hatred, of war.”54
In the last pages of the essay, Lauterpacht noted that some of
these ideas had made their way into international law, while others
were “still an aspiration.”55 And, he also made clear that the
aspirations were as important as the creation of legal rules, because
Grotius is “a well-spring of faith in the law as it ought to be. . . . .
What Grotius did was to endow international law with
unprecedented dignity and authority by making it part not only of
a general system of jurisprudence but also of a universal moral
code.”56 The treatise itself “became identified with the idea of
progress in international law.”57

50 Id. at 25–26. Lauterpacht also placed Locke in Grotius’s camp. See id. at 25
(noting how Locke did not take the “irrevocable subjection” approach to
“salvation for humanity”).
51 Id. at 43.
52 See id. at 46 (describing how Grotius considered there to be a natural right
of expatriation and a right of economic freedom).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 47. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 51.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 52. Lauterpacht’s account of The Rights of War and Peace thus matches
up almost exactly with his approach to international law. See Patrick Capps,
Lauterpacht’s Method, 82 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 248 (2012) (suggesting Lauterpacht’s
two ideals were “the establishment of peace between nations and the protection of
fundamental human rights”).
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2.1.2. Mary Ellen O’Connell
More than sixty years later, Mary Ellen O’Connell devoted a
critical part of The Power and Purpose of International Law to the
Grotian tradition. As I noted in the introduction, she used the
Grotian tradition to frame her response to Goldsmith and Posner.
More specifically, she reached back to Lauterpacht’s essay as
evidence of a pre-existing Grotian tradition which she selfconsciously brought into the twenty-first century and which she
also connected to the entire history of international law. In the
process, she presented Lauterpacht’s essay, not as a useful
document that is situated in a particular historical and academic
context, but rather as a desirable account of Grotius and his
reception, and of the sources of international law.
O’Connell did, however, situate Grotius to a limited extent,
consistent with Lauterpacht’s own analysis. Thus, O’Connell
wrote that Grotius sought “to contribute to ending the Thirty
Years’ War. He wanted to inspire greater humanity in the conduct
of the war and encourage the establishment of a legal order above
all warring factions after the war.”58 Even more, his treatise
“provided the necessary law for the new order” after the Peace of
Westphalia.59 Now, nearly four hundred years later, “[h]e is being
newly examined at the start of the twenty-first century as the
source of a classical response to leaders willing, as in his day, to
use violence and cruelty in achieving ambitions.”60 The Grotian
tradition, in other words, is not only alive and well, but also is
more relevant than ever.
O’Connell adopted Lauterpacht’s dichotomy between
pessimistic realists, with their contempt for humanity, and the
Grotian understanding that “what impels human action . . . is the
‘desire for society—not for society of any sort, but for peaceful and

58 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 26. See also id. at 33 (“Grotius wrote in reaction
to the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War”); supra note 35 and accompanying text
(discussing this point).
59 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 26. See also id. at 31 (“The essence of Grotian
thought is evident in the Peace of Westphalia”). For a similar assertion, see
Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, in
HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 65, 75 (Hedley Bull, Benedict
Kingsbury, & Adam Roberts eds., 1990) (stating Grotius’s theories were “given
concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia”).
60 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 27.
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organized life according to the measure of [human] intelligence.’”61
O’Connell then noted that although Grotius referred to Christian
doctrine as a basis for his understanding of human nature and
natural law, he also sought to provide a secular grounding for his
ideas about human reason and the sources of international law.62
She asserted, however, that this “secularization of natural law”
ended up fostering “[t]he tendency away from community toward
individualism” and sovereign authority.63 That is to say, Grotius’s
ideas, and the Peace of Westphalia that reflected his ideas, “also
contained the seeds of the ultimate challenge to the Grotian
worldview.”64
Be that as it may, O’Connell argued that Grotius’s natural law
thinking provided a firm basis for just war doctrine as well as for
the idea that nations should “avoid war at all costs.”65 More
generally, his ideas on the use of force “are still found in the law
regulating force.”66 Perhaps most important, the principles he
articulated “remain integral aspects of international law today,”
including “[i]n the area of enforcement.”67
Although O’Connell also singled out Hans Kelsen as an
important proponent of the Grotian tradition,68 Lauterpacht
61 Id. at 5 (quoting Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 24-25). See
also id. at 27 (making a similar contrast).
62 Id. at 27. See also HARRISON, supra note 35, at 139–41, 158–60 (noting Grotius
appealed to God but suggesting his focus was on a secular foundation for natural
law). John Haskell disagrees that Grotius was seeking to provide a secular
grounding for international law, and he suggests that language frequently cited in
support of this claim “was a common technique among earlier Catholic jurists,”
including Francisco Suárez. John D. Haskell, Hugo Grotius in the Contemporary
Memory of International Law: Secularism, Liberalism, and the Politics of Restatement and
Denial, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 269, 272 & n.10 (2011).
63 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 32.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 30.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 O’Connell linked Grotius and Kelsen because of their shared belief in the
authority of law, and she contended that Kelsen “revived basic Grotian concepts
of a unified legal system” and “brought Grotian concepts into the post World War
II peace order.” Id. at 6, 21, 48. See also id. at 48 (discussing Kelsen and “the belief
in the binding force of customary law”). I am less sure that Kelsen fits into
Lauterpacht’s version of the Grotian tradition. In Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen
advanced a monist conception of international and national law, but his version of
monism made room for the primacy of national law. See HANS KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW 333-44 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1967). In addition, Lauterpacht
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remains the central contemporary figure. It was Lauterpacht, she
argues, who looked back to Grotius for the idea of natural law, and
it was Lauterpacht who sought “to revive primary elements of
Grotius’s teaching” and “the Grotian tradition of natural law.”69
O’Connell’s praise of Grotius and Lauterpacht supports her
major claim about the importance of international law:
International law has deficits, yet it persists as the single,
generally accepted means to solve the world’s problems. It
is not religion or ideology that the world has in common,
but international law. Through international law, diverse
cultures can reach consensus about the moral norms that
we will commonly live by. As a result, international law is
uniquely suited to mitigate the problems of armed conflict,
terrorism, human rights abuse, poverty, disease, and the
destruction of the natural environment. It is the closest
thing we have to a neutral vehicle for taking on the world’s
most complex issues and pressing problems.70
O’Connell thus invoked Grotius and the tradition associated
with him in order to buttress her claim that there is a universal and
enforceable international law that serves the goal of peaceful,
orderly, and sociable existence. From the standpoint of the Grotian
tradition, international law is not only necessary, but also it is
“differed strongly [from Kelsen] in regard to the place of natural law for legal
construction.” MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE
AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, 356 (2002). See Capps, supra note 57,
at 265-66, 271 (explaining the different interpretative approaches of Kelsen and
Lauterpacht); see also JEFFERY, supra note 21, at 94-95, 105-06 (discussing the
influence of natural law on international law, as conceptualized by Lauterpacht).
Further, as Harold Koh noted, Kelsen saw international law as it then existed as
“a primitive form of law, based on self-help.” Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2616 (1997). See also KELSEN,
PURE THEORY OF LAW, supra at 323 (asserting similarities between international law
and primitive law). Still, as Koh also observed, Kelsen believed “states must
eventually . . . become a genuine, organized community in which ‘real’ obligations
are enforced by judges and a police force deployed by a supranational executive.”
Koh, supra at 2616 n.70 (quoting HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 417-18 (1952)). See also KELSEN, supra at 328 (stating “the
ultimate goal of the legal development directed toward increasing centralization,
appears the organizational unity of a universal legal community, that is, the
emergence of a world state”).
69 O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 52, 53.
70 Compare O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 14 (describing the importance of
international law), with Mead, supra note 16 (discussing liberal internationalism).
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natural. It is natural both because it reflects the aspirations of
human sociability and because it is based in universal principles
that are neutral and above competing interests—that is, because it
reflects, derives from, or simply is natural law in some sense of the
term.
O’Connell noted Lauterpacht’s attempt to define the main
features of the Grotian tradition, but because her book focuses on
enforcement, she did not expend much effort in applying those
features, with the exception of his ideas on the use of force. For
both her and Lauterpacht, the critical features of the Grotian
tradition came down to the importance of human sociability as a
foundation for law, the existence and definition of natural law, the
critical role of human rights, the need to control the use of force
and promote peace, and the clear and obvious distinction between
Grotian ideals and the dangerous pessimism of realists.
This idea of a Grotian tradition that is consistent with liberal
internationalism or progressive approaches to international law
continues to have great force,71 even for those who do not profess
allegiance to it. Indeed, the efforts of some scholars to develop
critical perspectives on the Grotian tradition reaffirm the
importance of these views.
2.2. Variations: Grotius as Essential to a Liberal World Order
The Lauterpacht/O’Connell version of the Grotian tradition in
international law may be the most significant contemporary
account of Grotius’s importance, but it is not the only one. A
different Grotius appears in, for example, the writings of Martin
Wight and Hedley Bull on international relations. Still, most of
71 E.g., Randall Lesaffer, The Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and Continuity
in the History of International Law, 73 BR. Y.B. INT’L L. 103 (2002). See also SCHARF,
supra note 14, at 22-27 (arguing that although the Grotian tradition has
experienced ups and downs, its pervasive influence can be seen in various areas
of international law). Larry May’s work also reflects the Lauterpacht/O’Connell
view. See LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 27-33 (2008); LARRY
MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 53-58 (2007) (echoing Lauterpacht and
O’Connell’s viewpoint with an analysis of Grotius and natural law). But his
views sometimes differ, such as when he follows Richard Tuck and refuses to
draw a sharp distinction between Grotius and Hobbes. See also MAY, AGGRESSION,
supra at 3 (arguing that “crimes of aggression are deserving of international
prosecution when one State undermines the ability of another State to protect
human rights.”). For a critical assessment of the Grotian tradition in the general
sense that Lauterpacht defined it, see generally Haskell, supra note 62.
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these variations on the Grotian tradition overlap with Lauterpacht,
and O’Connell’s version of Grotius in at least one critical respect:
the claim that Grotius himself is the wellspring for the most
normatively attractive vision of international order and therefore
that he is the foundational figure in the tradition that bears his
name.
2.2.1. Grotian Moments
Richard Falk’s writings on Grotius overlap with the orthodox
view. Indeed, in many ways he continued where Lauterpacht left
off, albeit with more of a focus on international relations than on
international law. Falk assesses Grotius’s work as follows:
What Grotius attempted, whether wittingly or not, was to
provide the foundation for a new normative order in
international society that acknowledged the realities of an
emergent state system and yet remained faithful to the
shared heritage of spiritual, moral, and legal ideas that any
Christian society could still be presumed to affirm as
valid.72
In this view, Grotius is an essential figure in the progressive
narrative toward an international rule of law that advances such
things as democracy and human rights.
But Falk’s praise of Grotius stops well short of Lauterpacht’s.
He insists that “[i]t is a mistake to suppose, as do such recent
diverse commentators on Grotius as Hersch Lauterpacht and
Hedley Bull, that the Grotian solution proposes substantive
answers that are directly applicable to the transitional twentiethcentury torments of the state system.”73 To the contrary, Falk
suggests that, from a contemporary perspective, Grotius erred by
“accommodating statism to an excessive and unnecessary degree”
and being “insensitiv[e], from a normative standpoint, to the fate
of individuals and groups confronted by repressive patterns of
governance.”74

72 RICHARD FALK, The Grotian Quest, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 36, 37-38 (Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, & Saul H. Mendlovitz
eds., 1985).
73 Id. at 40.
74 Id. at 38–39.
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Although he holds on to one arguably specific claim in his
reading of Grotius—“the idea that restraint and decency could be
grounded in law”75—Falk largely abstracts from the specifics of
Grotius’s writings to stress, instead, the role that Grotius played in
his time. Falk claims that Grotius “fulfilled the normative potential
of his historic epoch” and that his writings illustrate “the possible
role of law and legal thought in a time of transition between world
order systems.”76 Within this partial historicization, Falk stresses
Grotius’s larger goal of meeting world historical moments
(“Grotian moments”) with a “blend [of] disparate moral, legal, and
political perspectives” that coalesce into “a coherent conception of
world order.”77
For Falk, in short, the legacy of Grotius—the ongoing “Grotian
quest”—is the task of advancing the transition from statism to
globalism. The Grotian skill that this quest requires is a somewhat
pragmatic idealism; in particular, the ability to “accord[] sufficient
status to international developments that depart from the premises
of the state system without losing persuasiveness.”78 For all that,
however, the idea of a Grotian moment suggests that one is present
at and part of a creation. More specifically, it suggests that Grotius
and his response to his moment are touchstones for responding to
subsequent similar moments. In the end, therefore, and despite
their differences, Falk joins Lauterpacht in portraying Grotius as a
heroic, foundational, and inspirational theorist who continues to be
relevant to contemporary problems.
Falk’s idea of a Grotian moment has not only been influential; it
has also become a nearly irresistible catchphrase.79 More recently,
Id. at 38.
Richard Falk, The Grotian Moment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 72, at 7.
77 Falk, The Grotian Quest, supra note 72, at 39.
78 Id. at 41.
79 Boutros Boutros-Ghali famously invoked the term. See Boutros BoutrosGhali, A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1609 (1995). For other works that
have used the term in either their text or title, see B.S. Chimni, A Just World Under
Law: A View from the South, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 199, 201 (2006); Ibrahim J.
Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (2004); Samuel K. Murumba, Grappling with a Grotian
Moment: Sovereignty and the Quest for Normative World Order, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
829 (1993); Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of
Statehood, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 209 (2011). Falk’s variant phrase—the
Grotian quest—has been used to describe Judge Christopher Weeramantry, who
75
76
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Michael Scharf has gone beyond the rhetoric to develop the idea of
the Grotian moment in a new direction. Where Falk stressed
“international developments that depart from the state system,”
Scharf uses the Grotian moment “to denote a transformative
development in which new rules and doctrines of customary
international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance.
Usually this happens during a period of great change in world
history.”80 Scharf thus uses the Grotian moment in a very concrete
fashion to assist the analysis of and gain critical purchase on the
development of customary international law.
Both Falk and Scharf move away from a direct reliance on the
specific positions taken by Grotius in his writings, even as they
valorize his accomplishments. Their shift in perspective arguably
undermines the Grotian tradition by raising the question why
commentators feel a persistent need to link current debates,
concerns, and commitments to what Grotius wrote. Indeed,
notwithstanding Scharf’s thoughtful development of Falk’s idea,
many contemporary references to “Grotian moments” drain the
phrase of any meaningful link to Grotius and instead serve as a
fancy synonym for “turning point,” “crossroads,” or “important”
moment for international law.81
2.2.2. Grotius and the Middle Path
For the English school of international relations, Grotius was
centrally important, but his importance took a different form.
Martin Wight argued that Grotius stood for a rationalist, reformist
approach—“a broad middle road”82—between Machiavellian
realism (or positivism) and Kantian idealism. And not surprisingly
in turn has also embraced the idea of the Grotian moment. See Saul Mendlovitz &
Merav Datan, Judge Weeramantry’s Grotian Quest, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401 (1997); Christopher Weeramantry, Opening Tribute to Hugo Grotius, 14
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1516, 1518 (1999).
80 SCHARF, supra note 14, at 5. See also Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian
Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in Times of
Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 443-53 (2010) (explaining the
concept of “Grotian Moment”).
81 See Benedict Kingsbury, A Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice?: Grotius,
Law, and Moral Skepticism in the Thought of Hedley Bull, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 3, 10
(1997) (making a similar point).
82 MARTIN WIGHT, INTERNATIONAL THEORY: THE THREE TRADITIONS 15 (Gabriele
Wight & Brian Porter eds., 1991).
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the middle way, the balanced approach, is the most attractive
because it matches best with the world as it actually is, in which
states will have periods of cooperation and of conflict but in which
larger, general principles are also important. Thus, Wight appears
to have taken the position that the actual content of Grotius’s
writing was less important than what he saw as Grotius’s general
stance as “reconciler and synthesizer.” Accordingly, Wight argued
that “Grotius reflects more accurately [the] morally
multidimensional character of our experience than, arguably, any
other writer on the subject . . . . He reproduces an endless dialectic
of the real and ideal, the actual and permissible, with all its
tensions and facets, hesitations, and qualifications.”83
Hedley Bull drew on Wight, and in particular on the idea of
three traditions: Hobbesian realism on one end, Kantian idealism
on the other, and, in the middle, the Grotian “internationalist”
position. According to Bull, this version of the Grotian tradition
“views international politics as taking place within an international
society” of sovereign states that have “common rules and
institutions.”84 Bull did not feel the need to adopt Grotius’s view
on specific topics, and he wrote that Grotius’s reliance on natural
law was outdated and that “the Grotian idea of international
society later came to rest on the element of consensus in the actual
practice of states” – a view that he endorsed.85 Wight and Bull
agreed that the Grotian tradition was the most attractive way to
approach international relations, but they differed on its exact
content. As Edward Keene has pointed out, “conventional legal
83 MARTIN WIGHT, FOUR SEMINAL THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY:
MACHIAVELLI, GROTIUS, KANT, AND MAZZINI 33, 34 (Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter
eds., 2005). Wight’s approach itself reflects a tradition. Mark Janis has suggested
William Blackstone, Thomas Jefferson, and James Kent all “adopted a middle
position, not unusual among eighteenth- and nineteenth-century lawyers, called
‘mixed’ or ‘Grotian’, which incorporated both positivist and natural elements.”
MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS, 1776-1939, at 52 (2010).
See also MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
GREAT EXPECTATIONS, 1789-1914, at 32 (2004) (providing additional discussion of
this argument).
84 HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD
POLITICS 23, 25 (3d ed. 2002). See also Bull, supra note 59 (making a similar
argument).
85 See Andrew Hurrell, Foreword to the Third Edition, in BULL, ANARCHICAL
SOCIETY, supra note 84, at x (quoting a letter from Hedley Bull to Shaie Selzer from
Nov. 14, 1975); see also Kingsbury, supra note 81 (analyzing Grotius and the
concept of the “Grotian moment”).
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positivists and naturalists” were realists under Wight’s
formulation but would “presumably be in [Bull’s] GrotianRationalist tradition.”86 As for Lauterpacht, he arguably fits better
as an idealist than as a Grotian under either Wight’s or Bull’s
account; the same is true of Lauterpacht’s version of Grotius. In
any event, and like the Lauterpacht/O’Connell version of the
Grotian tradition, the Wight/Bull idea of the Grotian middle path
has weathered criticism and remains influential.87
2.3. Dissents: Grotius as Authoritarian, Realist, or Hobbesian
The dominant trend has been to portray Grotius as the father of
international law, the foundation of liberal internationalism, and
the blazer of the middle path in international relations. But there
has also long been an alternative view of Grotius that links him to
realism, statism, and even absolutism.88
Aspects of this dissenting view may have been the received
wisdom among early writers. For example, Pufendorf and Vattel
did not trouble to characterize Grotius as a great humanitarian,
even as they adopted and sometimes revised many of his views.89
Perhaps more important is the tradition of dissenting from
Grotius’s views because they fostered or accommodated
authoritarian regimes. Thus, for Rousseau, Grotius and Hobbes
did not articulate diverging philosophies. “The truth is that their
principles are exactly alike. They differ only in their manner of

86 Edward Keene, The Reception of Hugo Grotius in International Relations
Theory, 20-21 GROTIANA 135, 153–54 (1999-2000). See also KEENE, supra note 18, at
29–39. For other accounts of Wight and Bull’s views on the Grotian tradition, see
Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts, Introduction: Grotian Thought in International
Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 59, at 55–57;
A. Claire Cutler, The ‘Grotian Tradition’ in International Relations, 17 REV. INT’L
STUD. 41–45 (1991); Kingsbury, supra note 81, at 19–20.
87 For additional discussion of the English school and the relationship among
Bull, Lauterpacht, and Wight, see JEFFERY, supra note 21, at 113–38; Lesaffer, supra
note 71, at 108–09.
88 See J.P. Somerville, Absolutism and Royalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1450–1700, 347, 362 (J.H. Burns & Mark Goldie eds., 1991)
(“Since Rousseau, [The Rights of War and Peace] has . . . commonly been seen as a
major text of early modern absolutist thinking.”)
89 Cf. HARRISON, supra note 35, at 132-62 (discussing Grotius and Pufendorf);
RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 152-65, 191-96 (1999) (discussing the
relationships among the writings of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel).
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expression. Hobbes bases himself on sophisms, and Grotius on
poets. They have everything else in common.”90 Rousseau also
asserted that Grotius’s “most persistent mode of reasoning is
always to establish right by fact. One could use a more rational
method, but not one more favorable to tyrants.”91 Indeed,
according to Rousseau, Grotius “spares nothing to divest the
people of all their rights and to endow kings with them as artfully
as possible.”92 Writing in 1795, Immanuel Kant similarly derided
Grotius (along with Pufendorf and Vattel) as a “sorry comforter” of
“military aggression.”93
A handful of recent writers have advanced similar criticisms of
Grotius. B.V.A. Röling was particularly harsh. For Röling,
“Grotius’ system was in keeping with the arrogance of power,
namely of the power which Europe was to exercise over the rest of
the world.”94 Grotius’s ideas were “hypocritical”:
[T]he enormous popularity of Grotius’ just war doctrine is
rendered comprehensible when we recognize that in theory
it could gratify the high-minded and could point to the way
which could reasonably lead to a better world, while it did
not in any way restrict the endeavour of subjugating the
non-European nations to European authority. Grotius’
system could afford a pretext for every desired act of
violence.95
More recently, Edward Keene has disputed the idea—
embraced by Bull and others—that Grotius was important because
he anticipated the Westphalian system. To the contrary, Keene
argues, Grotius was important for two primary reasons. First, his
90 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE OR ON EDUCATION 458 (Allan Bloom trans.,
Basic Books 1979) (1762).
91 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right,
in 1 ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH GENEVA MANUSCRIPT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
45, 47 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762).
92 Id. at 60. Rousseau also highlighted Grotius’s arguments about slavery. Id.
at 49–50.
93 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 93, 103 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (“Hugo Grotius,
Pufendorf, Vattel and the rest (sorry comforters as they are) are still dutifully
quoted in justification of military aggression . . . .”).
94 B.V.A. Röling, Jus ad Bellum and the Grotian Heritage, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE GROTIAN HERITAGE 121 (T.M.C. Asser Instituut ed., 1985).
95 Id. at 121–22.
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idea of divisible sovereignty not only served Dutch interests in
their struggle with Spain but also provided the intellectual
foundation for unequal treaties whereby one party would transfer
part of its sovereignty to the other.96 Second, Grotius argued that
the private right to occupy property, although largely obviated in
Europe, still applied “in places without inhabitants, as on the sea,
in a wilderness, or on vacant islands,” which provided a
justification for European seizures of land.97 Keene suggests that
Grotius himself did not intend these consequences.98 Still:
It is the colonial and imperial systems beyond Europe that
have the closest affinity with Grotian ideas about the law of
nations and, if we are to talk about a ‘Grotian conception of
international society’ at all, we should rather be concerned
with the distinctly non-Westphalian structure of political
and legal order in the extra-European world.99
One writer has approached the dissenting position from a
different perspective. Richard Tuck has elaborated on Rousseau’s
assertion that Grotius and Hobbes shared the same principles.
Among other things, Tuck argues that Grotius developed “a theory
about minimal natural sociability, based on a general view of the
role of self-interest in the natural world. ”100 Even more, “Grotius
endorsed for a state the most far-reaching set of rights to make war
which were available in the contemporary repertoire.”101 In the
end, “Hobbes need not be seen as differing from Grotius over
ethical matters, strictly understood, at all; his very different
96 See KEENE, supra note 18, at 45–52 (explaining Grotius’s theory that
sovereignty is divisible). See also Ileana M. Porras, Constructing International Law
in the East Indian Seas: Property, Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius’ De
Iure Praedae—The Law of Prize and Booty, or “On How to Distinguish Merchants from
Pirates,” 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 741, 780–86 (2006) (focusing on how Grotius’s theory
of divisible sovereignty aided the Dutch in their struggle with Spain).
97 KEENE, supra note 18, at 54–57 (quoting Grotius, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS at
92).
98 See id. at 6, 94–95 (noting that there is little to no evidence to suggest that
Grotius was an imperialist).
99 Id. at 97.
For extensive deconstructive and post-colonial analysis of
Grotius, see ERIC WILSON, THE SAVAGE REPUBLIC: DE INDIS OF HUGO GROTIUS,
REPUBLICANISM, AND DUTCH HEGEMONY WITHIN THE EARLY MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM
(C. 1600-1619) (2008).
100 TUCK, supra note 89, at 102.
101 Id. at 108.
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conclusions can all follow solely from a disagreement about the
material conditions for the application of the ethical principles.”102
Thus, Tuck argues, it is no wonder that “it became to a degree a
commonplace in late seventeenth-century Germany . . . that there
was at bottom little to choose between Grotius and Hobbes.”103
Tuck’s argument, which does not criticize Grotius for his apparent
closeness to Hobbes, is controversial. One commentator has
charged that “Tuck has presented a work of history with an
evident political message, but one that is . . . politically backwardlooking, not to say regressive.”104
The Grotian tradition persists in the writings of international
lawyers and international relations scholars, even if the diverging
elements sometimes threaten to outweigh the common ones. That
is to say, particularly when one also takes account of dissenting
views, agreement exists on the importance of Grotius and the
existence of a Grotian tradition of some kind, but the specific
content of the tradition remains somewhat elusive. Grotius and
the Grotian tradition operate, at least sometimes, as placeholders
for particular theories about what international law is and how it
should operate. The tradition, then, is in part one of content, and
in part one of invocation.105
3.

GROTIUS IN HISTORY AND THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE
WITHOUT TRADITION

In a recent lecture, Antony Anghie agreed that, for Lauterpacht,
Grotius “is a heroic figure seeking to control the escalation of
violence and to reconstitute a ruined Europe.”106 But Anghie also

102 Id. at 135. Compare Larry May’s distinction between Grotius and Hobbes:
“Thomas Hobbes is a minimal natural law theorist who proceeds to construct
norms on the basis of human desires for self-preservation and for peace; and
Hugo Grotius is a minimal natural law theorist who constructs norms . . .
grounded in the human desire for a peaceful and happy life in a community.”
MAY, WAR CRIMES, supra note 71, at 58. See also HARRISON, supra note 35, at 132–62
(agreeing Hobbes and Grotius were minimalist but also noting differences
between them).
103 TUCK, supra note 89, at 102.
104 George Wright, Tuck’s Grotius: De Iure Praedae in Context, 26–28
GROTIANA 366, 378 (2005-2007).
105 For a similar assessment, see JEFFERY, supra note 21, at 14–16 (arguing the
Grotian tradition is an intermediate legal category without firm definition).
106 Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change, supra note 19, at 1321.
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noted that recent scholarship on Grotius casts him in a different
light. This newer version of Grotius:
is a more ambitious and self-interested figure, seeking his
own advancement and writing on the themes of war,
commerce, privateering, mercenaries, and trade in a
manner clearly linked with his immediate employment.
This is the Grotius that engaged in the dual enterprise of
establishing the Dutch Republic and asserting Dutch
sovereignty as an incipient trading empire.107
As for the content of Grotius’s writing:
[I]t is also disconcerting to note that his great work, which
is understood as a blueprint for peace, is principally about
war, and that war appears to be placed under little restraint
in Grotius’s system. . . . A survey of The Rights of War and
Peace indicates that Grotius permitted recourse to war in an
extraordinarily broad range of circumstances, including
breach of contract.108
This part addresses these issues. The first section draws on
recent historical work about Grotius and the Dutch Republic to
compile a biographical sketch that situates Grotius and his early
writing on international law firmly in their historical context. The
second section reads portions of The Rights of War and Peace in a
similar way. Not surprisingly, the effort to contextualize Grotius
shows that he was a man of his times who was engaged in the
political issues of his day and who expended his energies to
resolve them in a way that accorded with his worldview – which
centered very much on the survival and prosperity of the Dutch
Republic. The same can be said of reading The Rights of War and
Peace as a document addressed to a particular time and place. But
this effort also raises a standard set of questions. If Grotius and his
work are products of their time, is there anything special that
remains beyond historical analysis? Why, if at all, should he or his

107 Id (citation omitted). See also Martine Julia van Ittersum, The Long Goodbye:
Hugo Grotius’ Justification of Dutch Expansion Overseas, 1615–1645, 36 HIST. EUR.
IDEAS 386, 409 (2010) (“[T]he imperialist framework of Grotius’ thinking on
natural law and natural rights . . . is fast becoming the new consensus”).
108 Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change, supra note 19, at 1321, 1322
(citation omitted).
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work be an inspiration today? Is he a prototype of something that
remains useful? The final part of this article turns to these
questions.
3.1. Hugo Grotius
3.1.1. Background and Early Career
Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot) came from a wealthy family
with noble pretensions that was part of the ruling oligarchic elite of
Delft, in Holland, and whose members had financial interests in
Dutch trading efforts.109 His family provided him with every
possible educational opportunity, along with access to their
intellectual and political connections.110 Grotius responded by
excelling at his subjects and engaging in scholarly and literary
activity from a young age.111
Although Grotius remained heavily engaged in scholarly and
literary pursuits throughout his life, he also trained as a lawyer
and quickly involved himself in the politics of the United
Provinces, which included not just maintaining their fragile
independence from Spain, but also issues of political structure,
commercial expansion, and religious toleration and reform.112 He
109 See WILLIAM S.M. KNIGHT, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF HUGO GROTIUS 2-16, 24
(1925) (noting Grotius was not of strictly noble birth but that the De Groot family
had significant financial and political connections); Martine Julia van Ittersum,
Preparing Mare liberum for the Press: Hugo Grotius’ Rewriting of Chapter 12 of De
iure praedae in November-December 1608, 26-28 GROTIANA 246, 249 (2005-07)
(describing Grotius as a Delft patrician by birth). See also C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius
and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century, in HUGO GROTIUS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 59, at 98 (designating Grotius as “a member
of the patriciate of so-called ‘regents’ which dominated public life in Holland and
Zeeland.”); Tuck, supra note 17, at xii (describing the De Groots as regents of the
“self-selecting oligarchy which governed Delft”). See also CHARLES S. EDWARDS,
HUGO GROTIUS, THE MIRACLE OF HOLLAND: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL
THOUGHT 1 (1981) (answering the question of how Grotius was able to accomplish
so much at a young age by focusing on the support his “fairly well-to-do” father
gave him).
110 KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 22-30.
111 EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HUGO GROTIUS 4
(1969); EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 2; KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 31-32.
112 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 421-22. See also DUMBAULD, supra note 111, at 7
(describing Grotius’s training as a lawyer and admission to practice in 1599);
EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 2 (discussing Grotius’s youthful studies culminating
in law); KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 36, 55-58, 67-68 (looking at Grotius’s
involvement in various political matters).
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obtained opportunities and high office at a young age because of
the combination of his abilities and his family’s connections.113
Many of his early writings were linked to Dutch politics and Dutch
identity, and he helped to create “a republican political outlook to
fit the reality” of political life in the United Provinces.114 For
Grotius and his peers, republican government had a specific
character: “Grotius developed the idea that liberty, stability,
virtue, and prosperity are best preserved when government is
consultative and reserved to a closed oligarchy.”115
In 1604, the Dutch East India Company retained Grotius to
defend its interests, in particular its claim that it could seize
Spanish or Portuguese vessels as prizes. Over the next decade,
Grotius became “extremely successful as a political lobbyist” for
the Company, which in turn meant that he helped “shape the
foreign policy of the Dutch Republic in the 1600s and 1610s.”116
Because of his extensive involvement in advancing Dutch
commercial ambitions, Martine Julia van Ittersum argues that
Grotius is “one of the founding fathers of the First Dutch
Empire,”117 although she also maintains that for Grotius the Dutch
empire was always “essentially maritime and mercantile in
nature,” not territorial.118

KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 76; van Ittersum, supra note 109, at 249.
ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 421. See also SIMON SCHAMA, THE EMBARRASSMENT
OF RICHES: AN INTERPRETATION OF DUTCH CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE 78-81, 56667 (1987) (discussing how Grotius helped invent traditions of Dutch identity); van
Ittersum, supra note 109, at 249 (noting that in 1601, “the States of Holland
commissioned [Grotius] to write a history of the Dutch Revolt against Spain”).
115 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 421-22. Richard Tuck contends Grotius’s “early
political writings were very much in the modern humanist tradition, tracing out
an argument for the aristocratic republic, though stressing above all the need for it
to engage in commerce and manufacturing in order to secure its liberty against its
enemies, particularly of course Spain.” TUCK, supra note 89, at 79. Tuck also
argues this strain of humanism “applauded warfare in the interests of one’s
respublica, and saw a dramatic moral difference between Christian, European
civilization and barbarism.” Id. at 78. For a different view of humanism and its
relationship to early international law theory, see Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin
Straumann, The State of Nature and Commercial Sociability in Early Modern
International Legal Thought, 31 GROTIANA 22 (2010) (arguing Hobbes and Pufendorf
held different opinions than Grotius about the relationship between humanism
and international law).
116 VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at xi-xix.
117 Id. at xix.
118 van Ittersum, supra note 107, at 387.
113
114
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3.1.2. The Law of Prize
Grotius’s involvement with the Dutch East India Company is
important for several reasons. The first is that he wrote his first
major legal work—De Jure Praedae [Commentary on the Law of Prize
and Booty, or more simply, The Law of Prize]119—at the Company’s
request.120 Second, Grotius’s long identification with the Company
and its interests had a powerful effect on his legal thinking. Van
Ittersum argues that Grotius’s theoretical arguments “were always
subject to the . . . [Company’s] political needs and commercial
interests.”121 The Law of Prize bears out this claim.
The general goal of The Law of Prize was to show “that war
might rightly be waged against, and prize taken from, the
Portuguese, who had wrongfully tried to exclude the Dutch from
the Indian trade.”122 To achieve that goal, Grotius sought to
119 HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY (Martine
Julia van Ittersum ed., 2006). Grotius never published The Law of Prize. The
original Latin text was published in 1868, with an English edition in 1950. See
Note on the Text, in id. at xxiii (explaining the edition of the text and publication).
120 See VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at xxv. For extensive discussion of the
context in which Grotius took on the Company’s commission, see id. at 7-104. See
also Bull, supra note 59, at 70 (discussing how the capture of a Portuguese vessel in
1603 by a vessel of the Dutch East India Company led to De Jure Praedae);
DUMBAULD, supra note 111, at 7, 25; KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 81-83; Roelofsen,
supra note 109, at 100, 103-06; Tuck, supra note 17, at xxvii.
121 VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at iv. See also id. at 109 (stating “the survival
of the . . . [Company] and the safety of the Dutch commonwealth were of
paramount concern” to Grotius). My analysis of The Law of Prize is generally
consistent with but not identical to that of van Ittersum and Porras, supra note 96,
both of whom have also analyzed it extensively for similar reasons.
122 KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 80. Thus, The Law of Prize begins with the
following statements:

A situation has arisen that is truly novel, and scarcely credible to foreign
observers, namely: that those men who have been so long at war with the
Spaniards and who have furthermore suffered the most grievous
personal injuries, are debating as to whether or not, in a just war and
with public authorization, they can rightfully despoil an exceedingly
cruel enemy who has already violated the rules of international
commerce. Thus we find that a considerable number of Hollanders (a
people surpassed by none in their eagerness for honourable gain) are
apparently ashamed to lay claim to the spoils of war, being moved
forsooth, by compassion for those who in their own relations with the
Dutch have failed to observe even the legal rights of enemies. . . .
[I]f the Dutch cease to harass the Spanish [and Portuguese] blockaders of
the sea (which will certainly be the outcome if their efforts result only in
profitless peril), the savage insolence of the Iberian peoples will swell to

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

01_PARRY (DO NOT DELETE)

328

3/7/2014 7:26 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:2

construct an argument that would justify not only the specific
seizure by the Company of a Portuguese ship that gave rise to the
dispute that he was addressing, but also the nature of the
relationship between the United Provinces and Spain,123 and the
public-private issues raised by the fact that it was the Company,
and not the Dutch navy, that had acted.
Grotius’s solution was to insist that natural law, properly
understood, resolved these issues. One of the first claims in The
Law of Prize is that international relations, or at least the laws of
war and peace, do not derive from a code but rather from natural
law in the form of custom and reason.124 From that initial position,
Grotius developed a system of natural rights that applied equally
to public and private actors, which in turn allowed him to ground
the Dutch political and legal positions in fundamental principles of
justice while also making a series of arguments in the alternative
about the rules that ought to govern public and private disputes,
including public and private wars.
He began his analysis by asserting that “all things in nature . . .
are tenderly regardful of self, and seek their own happiness and
security.”125 Applied to humans, this means that “the just man’s
highest concern is for himself,” and “in human affairs the first
principle of a man’s duty relates to himself.”126 From this general
observation he derived the first two “precepts of the law of
nature”: “first, that It shall be permissible to defend [one’s own]
immeasurable proportions, the shores of the whole world will soon be
blocked off, and all commerce with Asia will collapse—that commerce
by which (as the Dutch know, nor is the enemy ignorant of the fact) the
wealth of our state is chiefly if not entirely sustained. On the other hand,
if the Dutch choose to avail themselves of their good fortune, God has
provided a weapon against the inmost heart of the enemy’s power, nor is
there any weapon which offers a surer hope of liberty.
GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119, at 9-10 (brackets in original).
123 TUCK, supra note 89, at 81. As Tuck observes:
It was not even clear to neutral observers that the States-General, let
alone the States of Holland, were legitimate sovereign bodies: Holland
was a ‘province’ of the Netherlands whose status was disputed, while
the States-General represented a union of provinces in revolt against
their king (the King of Spain). The Dutch thus seemed to be violating
some of the most fundamental principles of international relations.
124
125
126

GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119, at 16.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
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life and to shun that which threatens to prove injurious; secondly,
that It shall be permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain,
those things which are useful for life.”127
Only after stressing the primacy of self-interest and selfdefense did Grotius go on to note that “God . . . also will[ed] that
one created being should have regard for the welfare of his fellow
beings, in such a way that all might be linked in mutual harmony
as if by an everlasting covenant.”128 From this, he deduced two
additional laws of nature “whereby the preceding laws, which
relate to one’s own good, are complemented and confined within
just limits”: “Let no one inflict injury upon his fellow,” and “Let
no one seize possession of that which has been taken into the
possession of another.”129
Taken together, these four laws support human society, and
Grotius highlighted the “social impulse” of humans.130 Because
justice is central to maintaining society, Grotius also proclaimed
two more laws of nature: “first, Evil deeds must be corrected;
secondly, Good deeds must be recompensed.”131 So far, however,
Grotius was depicting human society as it would exist in
something similar to a state of nature.132 Although he did not use
that term, he did say that “it came to pass” that the tension
between self-interest and the social impulse resulted in “many
persons . . . either fail[ing] to meet their obligations or even
assail[ling] the fortunes and the very lives of others, for the most
part without suffering punishment.”133 “[T]here arose the need,”
he continued, “for a new remedy, lest the laws of human society be
cast aside as invalid”:
Therefore, the lesser social units began to gather
individuals together into one locality, not with the intention
of abolishing the society which links all men as a whole, but
rather in order to fortify that universal society by a more
dependable means of protection, and at the same time, with
Id. at 23 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 24.
129 Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
130 Id. at 28.
131 Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted).
132 Cf. TUCK, supra note 89, at 86 (arguing these passages present “in general
an extremely minimal picture of the natural moral life”).
133 GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119, at 35.
127
128
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the purpose of bringing together under a more convenient
arrangement the numerous different products of many
persons’ labour which are required for the uses of human
life.134
This more dependable means of protection “is called a
commonwealth . . . and the individuals making up the
commonwealth are called citizens.”135 The commonwealth is also a
source of law, not of immutable natural law but rather of
changeable human municipal law.136 By choosing to live together
in a commonwealth, an individual agrees to lay aside the natural
right “to pronounce judgment for himself and of himself” and
instead consents to be bound by the judgments of municipal law.137
Grotius then declared that, “[i]n the light of the foregoing
observations, it is clear that the civil power which manifests itself
in laws and judgements resides primarily and essentially within
the state itself.”138 What then of relations among states? Grotius
stated flatly that “there is no greater sovereign power set over the
power of the state and superior to it, since the state is a selfsufficient aggregation.”139 But the lack of a higher sovereign did
not mean there was no international law. To the contrary, Grotius
contended that the law of nations consisted, first, of “right reason”
that promotes “universal concord . . . in relation to that which is
good and true,” which he also described as “a secondary law of
nature.”140 The second component of the law of nations was “a
species of mixed law, compounded of the [primary] law of nations
and municipal law.”141 The municipal law of nations, in turn,
consisted of “the various peoples who had established states for
themselves enter[ing] into agreements” about the “common good
of an international nature.”142 Further, these agreements about the

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 45 (alteration in original).
Id.
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international common good took two forms: laws formed by
express agreement and “accepted custom.”143
Grotius also used “the law of nature, or law of nations” to
explain the contrasting relationships between a state and its
citizens and between a state and the citizens of other states.144 All
of the state’s power, including its power to punish and make war,
comes from the original “collective agreement” among the
individuals who become its subjects, which means that “the right
of chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by
the state.”145 But it also follows, according to Grotius, that when a
state inflicts punishment, it does so under two different legal
regimes. When it punishes its citizens, it does so under “civil
law.”146 Yet the state “derives no power over [“foreigners”] . . .
from civil law, which is binding upon citizens only because they
have given their consent.”147 For foreigners, therefore, “the law of
nature, or law of nations, is the source from which the state
receives the power in question.”148 Put differently, when a state
takes action against other states or against people outside its
community, its powers and obligations derive from natural law.
Further, those powers and obligations are presumably similar to
the broad powers and limited obligations of an individual in the
state of nature.149 Even more, it seems to follow that whenever

143 Id.
Because there was no neutral forum for deciding disputes about
international rights, Grotius suggested a different approach: “In regard to judicial
procedure, precedence shall be given to the state which is the defendant, or whose
citizen is the defendant; but if the said state proves remiss in the discharge of its
judicial duty, then that state shall be the judge, which is itself the plaintiff, or
whose citizen is the plaintiff.” Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted). He also made clear
the defendant state does not satisfy this obligation merely by having a
proceeding—the state must actually confront the claim of right and satisfy it if it is
a just claim. Id. at 48.
144 Id. at 137.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See TUCK, supra note 89, at 82-83. Tuck argues this passage makes “the
claim that an individual in nature . . . was morally identical to a state, and that
there were no powers possessed by a state which an individual could not possess
in nature.” Further, he argues that because Grotius had a strong idea of state
sovereignty, this passage also means Grotius was articulating the idea of the
“autonomous right-bearing individual,” such that “we can best understand the
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anyone—state or individual—is acting in a state of nature, violence
is permitted to redress wrongs.150
Grotius emphasized the hierarchy of laws and rules that he had
developed, so that readers would know what to do if different
rules pointed in different directions. “[F]rom the standpoint of
origin,” he said,
the divine law is superior to human law, and the latter to
civil law. From the standpoint of purpose, that which
concerns one’s own good is preferred to that which
concerns another’s good; the greater good, to the lesser, and
the removal of a major evil, to the promotion of a minor
good.151
Self-interest thus held a privileged position.
War, in the system that Grotius was developing, was a method
for executing judgments, but it could only be appropriate if used to
enforce the kinds of rights that his system created. It could not be
used merely to inflict injuries.152 It was important, therefore, to
consider the circumstances in which a war, or the conduct of a war,
would be just—which included the question of when it would be
just to seize the enemy’s goods. After extensively analyzing these
issues,153 Grotius applied his insights to the specific issues between
the Dutch and, on the one hand, the people of the East Indies and,
on the other hand, the Portuguese and Spanish.154
At each point, Grotius concluded, the actions of the Dutch had
been just and proper, and they were entitled both to wage war and
to take prizes. He explained how the Dutch Republic, which in
theory was a rebellious province of the Spanish Empire, could
exercise sovereign powers and qualify as an entity capable of

rights which individuals possess vis-à-vis one another . . . by looking at the rights
which sovereign states seem to possess against one another.” Id. at 84-85.
150 Tuck declares that, for Grotius, “there is no significant moral difference
between individuals and states,” with the result that “both may use violence in
the same way for the same ends.” Id. at 85. He adds that “Grotius, like the good
humanist he was, had of course endorsed the claim that we may punish men over
whom we do not possess political rights.” Id. at 89.
151 GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119, at 49.
152 Id. at 50.
153 See id. at 51-242 (covering chapters iii to x).
154 See id. at 243-436 (covering chapters xi to xiii).
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engaging in a just war.155 He also concluded that “a just cause of
war exists when the freedom of trade is being defended against
those who would obstruct it,” which meant “the Dutch had a just
cause for war against the Portuguese.”156 This same analysis
“should be applied to the [private] cause of the Dutch East India
Company, in so far as its recourse to arms on its own behalf is
concerned.”157 The Dutch were also justified in waging war
because of “the injuries inflicted upon our people” by the
Portuguese and Spanish.158 And, because the position of the Dutch
and of the Company was just, both the Company and the country
were allowed to take and keep prizes.159
Although Grotius plainly developed the arguments in The Law
of Prize to serve the interests of his country and his employer, he
also appears to have found these arguments convincing and
satisfying on a personal level—which is no surprise given his
identification with the interests of his country and the company.160
And this point introduces the third reason that The Law of Prize is
important. It does not only exhibit a Grotius who was deeply
engaged in the major events of his day. It was also an important
source for – arguably even a first draft of – The Rights of War and
Peace.161

155 See id. at 392-95; see also Porras, note 96, at 780-81 (describing Grotius’s
argument that Holland could legitimately wage war against Spain because Spain
had attempted to usurp powers retained by the Dutch government); TUCK, supra
note 89.
156 GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119, at 363.
157 Id. at 389. In fact, the public and the private were one and the same. The
commanders of the Company’s ships also had official commissions from Prince
Maurits, who was high admiral of the United Provinces. See van Ittersum, supra
note 109, at 253 (arguing that such commissions made those commanders agents
of the Dutch state).
158 GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119, at 403.
159 Id. at 429-31.
160 See VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 108.
161 See Bull, supra note 59, at 71 (asserting The Law of Prize had a formative
effect on Grotius’s later works); see also DUMBAULD, supra note 111, at 23, 41, 54;
KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 80, 84; Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius and Gentili: A
Reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture, in HUGO GROTIUS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 59, at 133, 145; Tuck, supra note 17, at xvii.
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3.1.3. Lobbying, Diplomacy, and The Free Sea
Grotius never published The Law of Prize, apparently because it
was superseded by events and was no longer important to the
Company.162 But he continued to work for the Company while
also occupying official positions. For example, Grotius took part in
the 1607-09 peace talks between the United Provinces and Spain
that led to the Twelve Years Truce. He was involved both as a
representative of the Company and as a close associate of Johan
van Oldenbarnevelt, who held the high office of Land’s Advocate
for Holland and was also “in effect the prime minister of the Dutch
Republic.”163
During this period, Grotius also had a role in changes to the
structure of the Company—including the creation of the position
of Governor-General for the East Indies—that supported the
creation of a Dutch mercantile empire in addition to a trading
system. Indeed, van Ittersum contends that Grotius had “imperial
ambitions for the Company.”164 The publication of The Free Sea in
1609 supports her contention.
During the Dutch-Spanish negotiations, a group of the
Company’s directors asked Grotius to publish part of The Law of
Prize to strengthen the Dutch position and, in particular, to
respond to the Spanish argument that the Dutch should abandon
or curtail their trading efforts in the East Indies.165 Grotius lifted
out much of Chapter XII and made extensive edits to prepare it for
publication as a separate, anonymous pamphlet. Because the
United Provinces were negotiating a truce with Spain, Grotius
toned down the original manuscript’s criticisms of Spain; he also

162 See VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 188 (indicating that publication was
halted due to political happenings).
163 Tuck, supra note 17, at xiii. On Grotius’s involvement, see VAN ITTERSUM,
supra note 20, at 189-294, 331-44, 351-58. On Oldenbarnevelt, who was also a
family friend, see id. at xxiv. Grotius may have been less committed than
Oldenbarnevelt to peace with Spain, perhaps because of his closer association
with the Company. See generally C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and the Development of
International Relations Theory: “The Long Seventeenth Century” and the Elaboration of a
European States System, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 35, 52 (1997).
164 VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 354.
165 See id. at 279, 281–82, 331–42 (outlining Grotius’s contributions to the
peace negotiations between the United Provinces and their former rulers).
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delayed publication until the truce was signed, at the request of
Oldenbarnevelt.166
The Free Sea,167 as the pamphlet was titled, quickly became
influential because its arguments had broad application to
“contemporary disputes regarding the freedom of navigation,
trade, and fishing.”168
But its immediate purpose was to
“legitimize the continuation of the war in the East Indies during
the Twelve Years’ Truce, something that Grotius and the
[Company] directors had expected (and hoped for) all along.”169
The Free Sea contains two primary arguments. Most famous is
the one suggested by the title. The Portuguese could not restrict
Dutch ships from traveling to the East Indies because they did not
own the sea. The sea, Grotius declared, is “common to all and
proper to none.”170 He also insisted the shore is similar to the sea—
no one can wholly exclude another from the shore even if it is
possible to exercise some property rights over it.171 The point of
this argument, again, was to deny the claims of the Spanish and
Portuguese and uphold the claims and interests of the Dutch.
But Grotius also attacked the claim that the Portuguese could
have any kind of lawful possession of the islands in the East Indies.
They could not claim the islands by right of discovery, because
Europeans long had known about them. Nor could they claim the
islands were otherwise available for possession because the islands
already had owners: the people who lived on them.172 “These
See generally, van Ittersum, supra note 109, at 256, 259–60, 273–74.
HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA [MARE LIBERUM] (David Armitage ed.,
Richard Hakluyt trans., 2004) (1609).
168 David Armitage, Introduction, in id. at xviii.
169 VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 327. See also GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note
167, at xviii (noting after the truce was signed, “Grotius’ arguments could still
justify the [Company’s] encroachment on the Portuguese colonial empire, despite
the armistice in Europe”); KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 103–07 (arguing Grotius’s
works were used to perpetuate conflict between the Company and the Portuguese
Empire); Roelofsen, supra note 109, at 106–12 (pointing out that The Free Sea
meshed well with Dutch foreign policy).
170 GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 25. See also GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE,
supra note 119, at 322–23. Throughout this discussion, I will also cite the
analogous but earlier language in The Law of Prize.
171 See GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 26–27. See also GROTIUS, LAW OF
PRIZE, supra note 119, at 323–25.
172 See GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 14–15. See also GROTIUS, LAW OF
PRIZE, supra note 119, at 307–08.
166
167
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islands we speak of have, and always had, their kings, their
commonwealth, their laws and their liberties.”173
The primary goal of this second set of arguments, like the first,
was to disentitle Portuguese (and, by extension, Spanish) claims
and to justify Dutch trading activity. But Grotius also made clear
in an unpublished part of The Law of Prize that he saw the
inhabitants of the East Indies both as allies and as people
oppressed by the Portuguese and Spanish.174 Even more, as he
wrote in both books, they had the same natural rights as the
Europeans. Thus, they had “authority over their own substance
and possessions which without just cause could not be taken from
them.”175 These rights of property were equal to those of European
traders.176 This meant in turn that both the Dutch and the peoples
of the East Indies were free to enter into trading contracts with
each other, because “liberty of trading is agreeable to the primary
law of nations,” and no nation “may justly hinder two nations that
are willing to trade between themselves.”177
What followed from these arguments? At a general level,
Grotius’s analysis, derived from The Law of Prize, rested on the idea
of a law of nature and a law of nations that were universal and
173 GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 13. See also GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE,
supra note 119, at 306.
174 See GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119, at 296–98.
See also VAN
ITTERSUM, PROFIT, supra note 20, at 359–60 (explaining the Company earned trust
by ousting the Spanish and Portuguese from the East Indies).
175 GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 14. See also GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE,
supra note 119, at 308.
176 Grotius paraphrased Francisco de Vitoria: “Victoria therefore rightly saith
that the Spaniards got no more authority over the Indians for this cause than the
Indians had over the Spaniards if any of them had come formerly into Spain.”
GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 15. See also GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note
119, at 308 (also relying on Vitoria). For Vitoria’s statement, see Francisco de
Vitoria, On the American Indians (De Indes), in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 231,
233, 264-65 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence eds., 1991) (“[T]he barbarians
possessed true public and private dominion. The law of nations . . . expressly
states that goods which belong to no owner pass to the occupier. Since the goods
in question here had an owner, they do not fall under this title. . . . [O]f itself it
provides no support for possession of these lands, any more than it would if they
had discovered us.”).
177 GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 51. See also GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE,
supra note 119, at 356–57); VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 359 (arguing Grotius
used a natural rights theory that “assumed the full humanity and unencumbered
sovereignty of indigenous peoples, who were, essentially, rights-bearing
individuals” to justify the Company’s aggression against the Portuguese).
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apparently did not depend upon religious or cultural
commitments. At the more concrete level of application, however,
Grotius concluded The Free Sea by reiterating that the Dutch had
the right to go where they wanted to go on the high seas and to
trade with whomever they wanted to trade, “whether we have
peace, truce or war with the Spaniard.”178 And if the Spanish or
Portuguese were to dispute or interfere with these natural rights,
then “proceed, thou most invincible nation on the sea, and boldly
fight not only for thine own liberty but for the freedom and liberty
of all mankind!”179
3.1.4. Pacta Sunt Servanda
During the Twelve Year Truce, a new challenge arose. English
merchants began to avail themselves of the same navigation and
trading rights that the Dutch claimed for themselves. Even worse,
they started offering better prices to people in the East Indies, who
therefore stopped complying with the exclusive agreements into
which they had entered with the Dutch. The Dutch “resorted to
harassment and intimidation, and, increasingly, the use of force in
order to make the natives honor the delivery contracts.”180
Tensions rose between the United Provinces and England, and
they held a series of conferences on these issues, which they were
not able to resolve until 1619, after Grotius had fallen from power
and influence. But, Grotius was active in the 1613 and 1615
conferences, once again in his dual role of government official and
Company lawyer.181 His efforts to defend Dutch interests required
him to apply his earlier writing to a new situation.
In his dealings with the English, Grotius prepared a series of
memoranda on which he argued they could not have unfettered
access to the East Indies. Free trade was not something that existed
in the abstract; the Dutch had earned it by taking risks, while the
English sought merely to take advantage of Dutch efforts.182 Even
more, the agreements between the Dutch and the peoples of the
East Indies were not simple commercial contracts. The mutual
GROTIUS, FREE SEA, supra note 167, at 57.
Id. at 58.
180 VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 360.
181 See id. at 358–95, 481–83.
182 See id. at 384 (discussing Grotius’s assertion that the Dutch, not the
English, had been the first to establish certain trading posts).
178
179

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

01_PARRY (DO NOT DELETE)

338

3/7/2014 7:26 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:2

obligations between the Company and the rulers of the various
islands made the agreements more like treaties.183 The Dutch,
therefore, were doubly wronged, first by their treaty partners who
violated agreements, and second by the English who intentionally
interfered with those agreements.184
To ground these arguments, Grotius returned to the idea that
the peoples of the East Indies had the same natural rights as
Europeans, which included the right to enter into and bind
themselves by contracts. But these treaty-like contracts could not
be governed by municipal law. Instead, they were subject to
natural law, specifically the obligation to honor covenants. Going
further, Grotius addressed the claim that the agreements were
unfair and, therefore, not binding, by making an argument that
would return in The Rights of War and Peace: the validity of the
unequal treaty. History afforded examples of people selling
themselves into slavery to obtain security, so that “[t]he inhabitants
of the Spice Islands were much more fortunate: they might have
lost their self-determination in economic affairs, but not in any
other sense.”185
Grotius also returned to the idea of private war. As he argued,
“in the absence of an independent and effective judge”—of which
there were none available in the East Indies—“each private person
resumed his sovereign powers and executed judgment in his own
cause.”186 That is to say, Company commanders could take up
arms against the English and the islanders to protect and enforce

183 See id. at 385 (describing Grotius’s assertions about the relationship
between the Company and the people of the Spice Islands).
184 See id. at 361–62 (explaining Grotius’s position that “even though [they]
were not guilty of breach of contract themselves,” the English “blatantly
disregarded the . . . principle pacta sunt servanda (contracts must be honored)”
because they provided the natives with firearms and a higher price for local
products, thus leading the natives to break their promise to deliver goods to the
Dutch).
185 Id. at 362, 387. See also 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17
at 826–28 (citing historical examples of peoples who have been part of “unequal
[a]lliance[s]”). Grotius was careful to insist the Dutch did not have sovereignty
over any territory in the East Indies, perhaps because that would have created an
obligation on their part to respect rights of free trade. See VAN ITTERSUM, supra
note 20, at 385–86 (discussing Grotius’s insistence that formal sovereignty
remained with the indigenous population).
186 VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at xxiii.
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the Company’s treaty rights.187 More bluntly, the Dutch could use
violence to enforce unequal treaties that laid the groundwork for a
Dutch empire.
Grotius consistently maintained the virtue of the Dutch
position against English intrusions—just as he had earlier asserted
the virtue of the Dutch against the Portuguese and Spanish. But
“[i]t was clear from the sources at his disposal that [Company]
officials in the Spice Islands used both fair means and foul to get
rid of English interlopers, with little regard for the liberty and
Thus, Grotius pressed his
sovereignty of the natives.”188
arguments about natural rights, the sanctity of treaties, and the
legitimacy of private enforcement through force of arms against a
background of Dutch violence of which he ought to have been
aware. To the extent Grotius was aware of this violence, his
arguments about consent and contract appear in a different light.189
Grotius’s first application of pacta sunt servanda—an idea that
would later be called “the grund norm of modern international
law”190—was thus to prevent the English from interfering in
unequal treaties between the Dutch and the soon-to-be-colonized
people of the Spice Islands, and to force those people to adhere to
those agreements. Grotius’s legal arguments, moreover, are
completely consistent with the ways in which, according to at least
some scholars, “treasured icons” of European modernity, such as
liberalism and nationalism, developed through colonial
practices.191
187 See id. at xxii, 388 (explaining Grotius favored the idea of Company
Commanders taking justice into their own hands). And, of course, the Company
commanders also held commissions from Prince Maurits, so that their actions
were arguably public as well as private. See supra note 157 and accompanying
text.
188 vAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 483.
189 See also id. at 265 (contending Grotius’s theories about natural rights
translated in his lifetime into colonial policies of acquiring possession to land and
entering into treaties with native rulers that bound those rules and their people to
Dutch interests).
190 SCHARF, supra note 14, at 20 (citing MAURICE H. MENDELSON, THE
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (1998)). See also Lauterpacht,
Groatian Tradition, supra note 9, at 43 (“[T]he rule pacta sunt servanda is the initial
hypothesis of the law of nations.”).
191 ANN LAURA STOLER, CARNAL KNOWLEDGE AND IMPERIAL POWER: RACE AND
THE INTIMATE IN COLONIAL RULE 146–47 (2002) (arguing “those most treasured
icons of modern Western culture—liberalism, nationalism, state welfare,
citizenship, culture, and ‘Europeanness’ itself” were “clarified among Europe’s
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Several commentators have bemoaned what they see as
Grotius’s willingness at the Anglo-Dutch conferences to soft-pedal
the views that he had published only a few years earlier in The Free
Sea.192 This position, and the debate it generates, depends in part
on the idea that Grotius was a disinterested or at least not
politically active scholar before the 1613 conference and that he
modified his scholarly ideas under pressure. But it seems clear
that Grotius always viewed The Law of Prize, and the excerpt that
became The Free Sea, as works of advocacy, even as he also believed
that his theories and conclusions were sound. After all, as an
attorney, a government official, and a diplomat, he was not merely
a mouthpiece; he was an active agent in the development of Dutch
policy and was also deeply committed to Dutch interests.
Thus, van Ittersum suggests a nuanced assessment that is
consistent with Grotius’s varied commitments: Grotius was careful
in his arguments at the trade conferences not to write anything
“that was in formal contradiction” with The Law of Prize, “[y]et he
certainly reformulated his argument and extended it in new
directions.”193 But even that assessment may nod too much in the
direction of the Grotian tradition. Yes, Grotius extended his
arguments, but his position at the Anglo-Dutch conferences is
consistent with what he wrote in The Law of Prize and The Free Sea
about the natural law rights to contract and to enforce contracts by
violence. Those were always arguments in which clear rules
would apply regardless of differences in power or information.
What is different here is the context in which Grotius articulated
his theories, which in turn made it harder for him to maintain the

colonial exiles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and only then brought ‘home’”);
cf. KEENE, supra note 18, at 45-57.
192 See generally KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 138–42. For the importance of the
negotiations to the idea of a Grotian tradition, compare Guy Ladreit de
Lacharrière, The Controversy Surrounding the Consistency of the Position Adopted by
Grotius, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GROTIAN HERITAGE, supra note 94, at 207
(suggesting Grotius was a good lawyer who tailored his arguments to the needs
of his client over time), with M. Bos, Response, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
GROTIAN HERITAGE, supra note 94 at 221, 223 (“I doubt whether it is right to
suggest that it was his clients’ interests that shaped his convictions. The
suggestion does not fit the depths of Grotius’ personality, it underestimates his
noblesse de caractère. Grotius was more than advocate, more than the servant of his
clients.”).
193 VAN ITTERSUM, supra note 20, at 370.
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tone of moralism and wounded outrage that had characterized his
earlier work.
Whether one accepts van Ittersum’s assessment or the one I
have suggested, one must then also at least consider whether or to
what extent this combination of lawyerly skill, formalism,
conviction, and service to Dutch interests also shaped The Rights of
War and Peace.194 And, in fact, the case has been made in part
already, with respect to Grotius’s discussion of free trade and
exclusive treaties in the later work.195
3.1.5. Revolt and Exile
In 1613, the year of the first Anglo-Dutch conference,
Oldenbarnevelt obtained Grotius’s appointment as pensionary of
Rotterdam.196 This new position coincided with a broader scope of
political activity—including engagement with the religious issues
Grotius already had begun to address in his writings.197
Protestants ruled the United Provinces, but they were split into
two factions: Arminians, or Remonstrants, controlled Holland and
Utrecht, but the rest of the United Provinces were dominated by
more orthodox Calvinists, or Counter-Remonstrants.198 In general,
Arminians supported a degree of religious toleration—which
would allow them to exist alongside Calvinists—even though
politically many Arminian leaders sought to continue Holland’s
hegemony over the rest of the United Provinces (a policy that
Grotius also supported).199 Calvinists, again in general, favored a
194 See Roelofsen, supra note 109, at 131 (“That [Grotius wrote] with a political
purpose is of course clear as regards Mare Liberum, but applies also, though much
more subtly, to De Jure Belli ac Pacis.”).
195 See Rosalyn Higgins, Grotius and the Development of International Law in the
United Nations Period, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note
59, at 267, 279 (suggesting a link between the Dutch East India Company’s
successful conclusion of several treaties creating exclusive trade rights, and the
approval of such treaties in The Rights of War and Peace); B.V.A. Röling, Are
Grotius’s Ideas Obsolete in an Expanded World?, in HUGO GROTIUS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 59, at 281, 281–82 & n.1 (making the same
point as Higgins).
196 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 428.
197 Id. at 428–29.
198 EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 3.
199 See id. (stating Arminius “came to doubt the rigid doctrine of
unconditional predestination, and to ascribe to man a moral freedom which was
contradictory to conservative Calvinism”); see also KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 148–
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closer relationship between church and state, and of central or
federal government control over the various provinces (perhaps in
part to control Holland), and they were suspicious of negotiations
with Spain.200 They also had the support of Prince Maurits.201
Maurits was Stadholder of five of the seven provinces, including
Holland, and both he and his father had already played crucial
roles in establishing and maintaining Dutch independence.202
Although Grotius initially sought to remain neutral in the
Arminian-Calvinist controversy, “he abandoned his neutrality [in
late 1613], siding categorically with Oldenbarnevelt and the
Remonstrants” and becoming “an indefatigable participant in the
fray.”203 During this period, Grotius did not publicly propose full
religious toleration. His focus was on a tolerant unity among
Dutch Protestant churches; in fact, it was only later, while in exile,
that he announced his willingness to tolerate Lutherans.204 Rather,
he advocated “liberty of conscience but within a strong public (or
49 (stating Grotius’s belief “that Holland should enjoy the hegemony of the Dutch
Netherlands, even at the cost of an almost enslaved United Provinces and central
national Government”). For Holland’s extensive influence on the structure of the
United Provinces, see ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 277.
200 See EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 3–4 (stating the anti-Arminian faction
known as the Gomarists advocated for the Calvinist state church, and a greater
degree of centralized government power); ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 434 (describing
Maurits’s position at the time—to remain moderate and avoid further
destabilization); KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 153–54 (stating the Calvinists
supported a centralized government as opposed to the Arminians who supported
the provinces and the oligarchs who ruled them); Tuck, supra note 17, at xiv
(“[B]roadly speaking, the Calvinist Church and its ministry looked to the princes
of the House of Orange to secure its power over the population . . . .”).
201 EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 3–4.
202 See id. (stating Maurits aligned with the Calvinist Counter Remonstrant
causes to expand his authority over the central government); KNIGHT, supra note
109, at 153–54 (contending Maurits used the conflict between Calvinists and
Arminians to centralize his power). Each province had at least the nominal ability
to select its own stadholder, who commanded its military forces. See ISRAEL, supra
note 20, at 301–04. But “the stadholderate, as such, was essentially a non-military
office, carrying powers and responsibilities relating to the political process and
administration of justice. The Stadholder . . . was the highest-ranking officeholder and dignitary in each province.” Id. at 305.
203 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 429. See also Roelofsen, supra note 109, at 117
(stating Grotius defended the states of Holland).
204 See ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 430, 502–03 (discussing changes in Grotius’s
toleration of other religions); Nellen, supra note 33, at 18 (“Before 1618 Grotius
envisaged his ideal of church unity within the framework of the Protestant
churches.”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss2/1

01_PARRY (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

3/7/2014 7:26 PM

GROTIAN TRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

343

state) Church which would overwhelmingly—to an extent
coercively—dominate, in the sphere of religion, for purposes
political and social, as much as spiritual.”205
Grotius and Oldenbarnevelt were unable to garner enough
support for this political settlement, which also would have
allowed each province to decide its own religious doctrine.206
Maurits in particular refused to approve Grotius’s plan, and the
political situation continued to deteriorate in 1617 and 1618.207
Unrest also grew among the artisan class who were suffering
economically under Oldenbarnevelt’s policies—and support of the
Calvinists tended to align with opposition to those policies.208
Maurits was a popular leader, and the unrest played into his
hands, because “he at least stood for central government and the
curbing of the power of the local oligarchies.”209 By contrast, while
Grotius sought compromise, he may also have been seen as—and
may in fact have been—trying to protect the interests of his class in
Holland. Be that as it may, to the Arminian political leaders and
their supporters, these developments were a harbinger of
repression at the hands of the more numerous Calvinists.210
In response both to popular unrest and the threat of Calvinist
repression, the government of Holland—controlled, in large part,
by Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius—authorized the cities of the

205 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 430. See also id. at 505 (asserting that, for Grotius,
“toleration . . . could only be safe in the hands of the Republic’s proper ruling
élite”); Nellen, supra note 33, at 25 (noting Grotius advocated tolerance within a
state-controlled church). Grotius may later have become less enamored of a state
church, as evidenced by his criticism of Hobbes’s view that people could be
required to adhere to an official religion. See JEFFERY, supra note 21, at 10–11, 54.
On these issues, however, the details were always crucial. Cf. HARRISON, supra
note 35, at 167 (“The most vigorous disputes in England [in the 1600s] were not in
fact about central issues of doctrine but rather about apparently trivial variations
in how people behaved in church . . . .”).
206 See ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 431–32 (chronicling efforts by Grotius and
Oldenbarnevelt to find agreement among the Remonstrant and CounterRemonstrant factions).
207 Id. at 436–39.
208 Id.
209 KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 154.
210 See id. (arguing the Calvinists’s determination to assert their power, “was,
in short, a Calvinistic declaration of war—clear indication of an intention to give
no quarter to Arminianism”); see also Roelofsen, supra note 163, at 55 (noting
Grotius’s elitism with respect to political and religious matters in Holland).
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province to raise their own militias to restore order.211 Utrecht
followed suit.212 In keeping with Grotius’s views, the government
also declared that military officers from Holland owed primary
allegiance to Holland, not to the United Provinces or Maurits.213
These actions were effectively an “assertion that sovereignty, in the
United Provinces, lay entirely in the provinces” except with respect
to matters delegated to the States-General—which again in
Grotius’s view, did not include religion.214
Maurits organized the opposition to Holland’s actions, and he
advanced the political position that the States-General had the
authority to settle “all differences and difficulties of importance” in
the United Provinces—essentially a declaration that the individual
provinces had limited sovereignty.215 The States-General ordered
Holland and Utrecht to disband the militias, but they refused,
claiming they were sovereign states and threatening to withhold
their financial contributions to the States-General.216 In the eyes of
Maurits and other Calvinists, Holland and Utrecht “had
overturned the fundamental principles of the Union.”217 Maurits
responded by marching through the two provinces with a body of
troops.218 He met no opposition and was able to disband the
ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 441; KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 155.
ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 441–42.
213 Id. at 441.
214 Id. See also id. at 446–47 (discussing Grotius’s view of the relationship
between political sovereignty and religion, and noting each province was “fully
sovereign” when it came to religion). Tuck suggests this was Grotius’s consistent
position on sovereignty within the United Provinces, and he links it to his claim
that, for Grotius, states were “sovereign in a strong sense.” TUCK, supra note 89, at
82–84. Keene, by contrast, argues Grotius’s writings on the Dutch revolt mirror
his more general theoretical position that sovereignty can be divided, such that
the holder of one part of the sovereignty can wage “a just public war” against the
entity that holds another party of the sovereignty, which in turn Keene uses to
refute the claim that Grotius was committed to an absolutist version of
sovereignty. KEENE, supra note 18, at 44–48. See also Gustaaf van Nifterik, Hugo
Grotius, Privileges, Fundamental Laws and Rights, 32 GROTIANA 1, 7–15 (2011)
(discussing Grotius’s arguments on sovereignty in 1617–22). My sense is that, for
Grotius, sovereignty was necessarily a work in progress within the republic,
which allowed him to advance this version of divided sovereignty at a point of
crisis, even if he might have taken a somewhat different view had his and
Oldenbarnevelt’s original plans succeeded.
215 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 441–44, 446–47.
216 Id. at 444–45.
217 Id. at 447.
218 KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 156.
211
212
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militias, imprison Grotius and Oldenbarnevelt, and purge
Arminians from positions of authority.219
Grotius wrote to Maurits from prison, “skillfully throwing all
the blame upon [Oldenbarnevelt] and suing for the Prince’s
mercy,” but he was unable to obtain his freedom.220 The StatesGeneral convened an ad hoc tribunal to try both men.221 Grotius
and Oldenbarnevelt contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction over them
and claimed they could only be tried by their sovereign
government of Holland.222 Their arguments were unavailing, and
the tribunal found both men guilty of treason.223 Oldenbarnevelt
was executed, while Grotius was sentenced to life in prison and his
property was confiscated.224
At the same time that Grotius found himself on the losing end
of political/religious violence, Europe was descending into the
Thirty Years War.225 This development, which for the Dutch
threatened the renewal of what must have seemed an eternal war
with Spain,226 easily could have influenced Grotius’s choice of
activities during his confinement and in France after his escape
from prison in 1621.227 Among other things, Grotius returned to
his unpublished Law of Prize and to the related topics of

219 For descriptions about the events surrounding Grotius’s arrest, see
DUMBAULD, supra note 111, at 12; EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 4–5; ISRAEL, supra
note 20, at 448–49, 451–54, 457–58, 460–63; KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 155–58
(same); and Tuck, supra note 17, at xiv-xv.
220 KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 158. See also Roelofsen, supra note 109, at 118–19
(stating Grotius’s pleas were not able to persuade Prince Maurits because
“Grotius had rendered himself particularly odious to Mauri[ts]”).
221 DUMBAULD, supra note 111, at 12.
222 Id. at 13; ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 458–59.
223 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 459.
224 For
sources recounting the events surrounding Grotius’s and
Oldenbarnevelt’s trials, see DUMBAULD, supra note 111, at 12–13; EDWARDS, supra
note 109, at 4–5; ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 458–59; and KNIGHT, supra note 109, at
159–61.
225 For a history of the war, see C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR
(1938).
226 See HARRISON, supra note 35, at 134–35 (noting Grotius lived with war
nearly his entire life); SCHARF, supra note 14, at 14–15 (making the same point).
227 See EDWARDS, supra note 109, at 5–6 (recounting the events leading up to
Grotius’s escape); KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 162–63 (telling the tale of Grotius’s
escape); Tuck, supra note 17, at xvi (discussing Grotius’s activities in prison and in
France after escaping).
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jurisprudence and international law.228 W.S. Knight suggests
Grotius’s scholarly goals were at least partly mercenary, stating
that, “[a]s author of an authoritative work on the Law of Nature
and Nations, he would have credentials for public employment
which, added to the influence of his personal friends, would be
certain of appreciation in the highest circles of Government in any
European State.”229 Be that as it may, the result was the publication
in 1625 of The Rights of War and Peace.
Grotius appears to have been torn about his next steps. He
carefully monitored and wrote about commercial, political, and
religious developments in Holland,230 and he held out hopes of
At the same time, however, Grotius had
returning.231
opportunities for employment with Denmark and France, and his
correspondence reflects uncertainty about what path to take.232
In 1631, Grotius briefly returned to Holland, hoping for
permission to remain from the new Stadholder, Frederik Hendrik,
who had taken office on his brother’s death.233 He almost certainly
also hoped to return to public life—his first appearance after
settling in Rotterdam “was to visit the town’s celebrated statue [of
the controversial humanist, Erasmus] to ‘show my affection for the
memory of [the man] who . . . showed the way to the right kind of
228 Tuck, supra note 17, at xvii (asserting Grotius “must have” returned to the
manuscript of The Law of Prize while in prison); van Ittersum, supra note 107, at
391 (noting a letter written from prison in which Grotius claimed to have
“resumed ‘the study of jurisprudence [iuris studium], which had been interrupted
by all my affairs’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
229 KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 191. See also Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition,
supra note 9, at 13 (suggesting Grotius may have written The Rights of War and
Peace “with an eye to diplomatic employment”). Whether Grotius actually
intended to write “an authoritative work on the Law of Nature and Nations,” or
whether he intended to write something narrower on the law of war—as
evidenced by the title—has been disputed. Compare Haggenmacher, supra note
161, at 156–59 (arguing The Rights of War and Peace is about the law of war, not
international law in general), and Peter Haggenmacher, On Assessing the Grotian
Heritage, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GROTIAN HERITAGE, supra note 94, at 152–
56 (presenting a similar argument), with Nellen, supra note 33, at 28 (noting
Grotius’s later statement that one purpose of the book was “to introduce young
lawyers to the science of law”).
230 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 501–02, 505, 511.
231 See Roelofsen, supra note 109, at 122–23 (discussing Grotius’s desire to
return to public life in Holland).
232 See van Ittersum, supra note 107, at 393–95 (detailing the various
employment opportunities described in his correspondences).
233 Id. at 395–96.
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Reformation’.”234 While in Holland, he also prepared a new
edition of The Rights of War and Peace in which “some of his more
disturbing claims were modified,” with the goal, according to Tuck
but disputed by others, of “win[ning] over his Dutch
opponents.”235 In particular, he edited the Prolegomena to
deemphasize further the role of self-interest and to “widen the
scope of God’s authority.”236 He also performed legal work for
another Dutch mercantile enterprise, the Northern Company, in
support of its effort to exclude British and Danish whaling vessels
from competing with it in the waters around Spitsbergen.237
Similar to his participation in the earlier negotiations with
England, Grotius had to grapple with the implications of his earlier
writings. According to van Ittersum, “[h]is legal opinion of March
1632 successfully reconciled the freedom of the seas with the titles
of ‘discovery’ and ‘actual possession’, largely by fine-tuning the
arguments of Mare Liberum and De Jure Belli ac Pacis.”238
But Grotius’s efforts to reinsert himself into Dutch commercial
and political life were unavailing. The towns of Holland voted
against an amnesty and ordered him to leave the country.239
Grotius subsequently accepted a position as Sweden’s ambassador
to France.240 Over time, his Dutch patriotism ebbed, as did his
focus on religious toleration and accommodation within an
exclusively Protestant framework.241 Yet he remained sufficiently

ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 514.
Tuck, supra note 17, at xv. Henk Nellen objects that this submissive
approach “would be totally incompatible with the approach Grotius observed
towards the fatherland in his correspondence after 1621.” Henk Nellen, On the
Occasion of the Acquisition of the First Edition of De iure belli ac pacis by the Peace
Palace Library, 33 GROTIANA 1, 14 (2012). Nellen also describes the publication
history of the first edition and confirms the importance of distinguishing among
editions. See id. at 14–15.
236 Tuck, supra note 17, at xxv.
237 See van Ittersum, supra note 107, at 396 (describing the background and
circumstances which led Grotius to write a legal opinion for the Northern
Company).
238 Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
239 ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 514–15; van Ittersum, supra note 107, at 398. See
also JEFFERY, supra note 21, at 13–14 (providing additional information about
Grotius’s efforts to return to Holland and the opposition to his return); Roelofsen,
supra note 109, at 126–27 (same).
240 van Ittersum, supra note 107, at 398.
241 Nellen, supra note 235, at 17–19.
234
235
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interested in the Dutch political and commercial cause (and the
cause of his family) that he went on giving advice to his former
colleagues.242 He, his brother, and his son all made free use of The
Rights of War and Peace as an authority in support of Dutch
interests.243
As a Swedish ambassador, Grotius was involved in issues
relating to the Thirty Years War, but disputes exist about how
effective he was.244 There is no indication that he did much to
advance peace or to mitigate the brutality of the war. He may have
deplored the war’s excesses, but he willingly advanced the
interests of a monarchy that was prosecuting that war.245 Sweden
“passed over Grotius in putting together their delegation to the
Westphalia conference in 1643,” but that decision may have had as
much to do with internal Swedish politics as with any
dissatisfaction with Grotius.246 Whatever the reason for that
decision, Grotius lost his position the next year and died in 1645,
before the end of the war.247
242 See van Ittersum, supra note 107, at 399–406 (discussing Grotius’s
continued efforts to provide advice to the Company and his desire to advance the
careers of his sons).
243 See id.
244 Compare Bull, supra note 59, at 69 (“Grotius does not seem to have been a
success as a diplomatist.”), and JEFFERY, supra note 21, at 14 (“Grotius was a
particularly poorly skilled diplomat who did not care much for the profession.”),
with Roelofsen, supra note 109, at 128–29 (opining that Grotius “admirably
fulfilled” the duties of his diplomatic post, even though he “did not play an
important role in Swedish-French negotiations”).
245 C.G. Roelofsen is particularly assertive on this point:

Grotius’ Swedish career is interesting mainly for one reason, namely his
taking political office under Oxenstierna [the Swedish Chancellor] at all.
This in itself goes far to disprove the view of the ‘sage of Delft’ as a
dispassionate prophet of the rule of law. Those who try to give Grotius
some credit for promoting the 1648 peace settlement in Westphalia are,
in our opinion, taking his own pious utterings in his letters to Dutch
friends far too seriously. However reluctantly, it seems that we have to
reconcile ourselves to a Grotius acting the part of an ornament to
Oxenstierna’s war machine. It may have been a somewhat incongruous
role, but Grotius stuck to it—albeit it with some hesitations and
misgivings.
Roelofsen, supra note 109, at 129–30 (footnotes omitted). See also Nellen, supra note
33, at 27 (stating “Grotius was not a pacifist” and noting his support for Swedish
military expansion).
246 Bull, supra note 59, at 69.
247 See generally KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 224–44, 273–74, 286–88.
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3.2. The Rights of War and Peace
In this section, I will focus on four of the features that
Lauterpacht claimed are central to the Grotian tradition: the
importance of the law of nature, the natural sociability of humans
as the basis for the law of nature, “the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual,” and the goal of peace or pacifism.248
Along the way, Lauterpacht’s claims that, for Grotius, all of
international relations are subject to law and that Grotius is a
progressive figure, also receive attention. My stress here is on the
differences between Lauterpacht’s characterizations of The Rights of
War and Peace, and my reading of that work—where my reading is
heavily influenced by the historical narrative in the previous
section. Although I am privileging Lauterpacht’s identification
and framing of these issues, they are all important to the idea of a
Grotian tradition in international law as well as, although to a
lesser extent, to the Grotian tradition in international relations
theory and the idea of Grotian moments.
3.2.1. Lauterpacht’s Description of Grotius’s Arguments
Lauterpacht argued that, for Grotius, “[t]he law of nature . . . .
is the law which is most in conformity with the social nature of
man and the preservation of human society.”249 Despite some
uncertainty, he concluded that “the most frequent use of the notion
of the law of nature by Grotius is what we should describe as
general principles of law arrived at by way of a generalization and
synthesis of the principal systems of jurisprudence.”250
Lauterpacht also claimed that Grotius had a robust conception of
the law of nature as:
the ever-present source for supplementing the voluntary
law of nations, for judging its adequacy in the light of ethics
and reason, and for making the reader aware of the fact that
the will of states cannot be the exclusive or even, in the last
resort, the decisive source of the law of nations.251

248
249
250
251

Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 51.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 21–22.
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As for human sociability, Lauterpacht stressed its importance
to international law, because international law is “a law of nature
largely based on and deduced from the nature of man as a being
intrinsically moved by a desire for social life, endowed with an
ample measure of goodness, altruism, and morality, and capable of
acting on general principles and of learning from experience.”252
The difference between humans and animals is that “man” has an
“impelling desire for society—not for society of any sort, but for
peaceful and organized life according to the measure of his
intelligence.”253
With respect to fundamental human rights, Lauterpacht
admitted that a cursory reading of Grotius is “disillusioning.”254
He recognized, for example, that Grotius did not value popular
sovereignty and rejected a general right of resistance to
oppression.255
But Lauterpacht suggested that Grotius was
reflecting “the essential needs of the times” and that he was not
alone in recoiling against “[t]he horrors of civil war.”256 As for
Grotius’s approval of people selling themselves into slavery, his
views were actually “humanitarian,” because enslavement was
preferable to other ways of treating captives.257
Further,
Lauterpacht observed that Grotius made several exceptions to his
rule against resistance and also made limited room for
“humanitarian intervention” when he declared that a state’s
mistreatment of its citizens provides a just cause for war.258
Alongside these points, Lauterpacht also listed specific instances in
which Grotius appeared to define natural human rights.259

Id. at 24.
Id.
254 Id. at 43.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 44.
257 Id. at 45.
258 Id. at 45–46.
259 See id. at 46 (“Neither must we forget that . . . he permitted and enjoined
the right of passive resistance; that he safeguarded the conscience and the
freedom of the individual in such matters as the right to refuse to carry arms in an
unjust, and even doubtful, war; and that he championed the cause of such claims
of the individual as the right of expatriation, the rights of economic freedom, and
the right to share, through a plebiscite, in the decision to transfer part of national
territory.”) (footnotes omitted).
252
253
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Finally, on the question of peace and pacifism, Lauterpacht
noted that Grotius “does not deny that war is a legal institution.”260
But, he noted the various ways in which Grotius sought to control
and limit the use of war, and he insisted that “[i]n general, there
breathes from the pages of De Jure Belli ac Pacis a disapproval,
amounting to hatred, of war.”261
3.2.2. Grotius’s Arguments in The Rights of War and Peace
Grotius’s discussion of sociability and natural law changed
between The Law of Prize and The Rights of War and Peace. It also
changed between the first and second editions of The Rights of War
and Peace. As my earlier discussion of The Law of Prize indicates,
there is little support in that work for Lauterpacht’s claims about
sociability.262 Grotius grounds sociability largely in self-interest.
His conception of natural law encompasses many rules, and it
forms an important part of the law of nations. Whether it is an
“ever-present source” is at least debatable, and it is not necessarily
“decisive.”263 Things are different with both versions of The Rights
of War and Peace.
The difference emerges in the opening paragraphs. Grotius
made clear right away that he was arguing against the primacy of
self-interest and the claims of skeptics that there were no
foundations for truth or justice.264 The answer to skepticism and
unchecked self-interest was Grotius’s reformulated, minimalist
version of natural law. Thus, the Prolegomena to the first edition
stated that natural law and natural rights do not arise simply from
the fact that “all men and the other animals are impelled by nature
to seek their own interests,” but instead from the human “desire
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
262 See supra Section 3.1.2 (discussing The Law of Prize).
263 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 21–22.
264 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 76–79. Grotius
cited the classical skeptic Carneades, but he just as easily could have cited more
contemporary skeptics such as Charron and Montaigne, who argued that there
are no universal rules and one should simply follow the established customs of
one’s country. See Capps, supra note 17, at 63, 72 (presenting the views of scholars
that Grotius targeted moral skepticism in his work and highlighting Tuck’s theory
that Grotius was “implicitly attacking the scepticism of Montaigne and Charron”);
HARRISON, supra note 35, at 40–41 (summarizing the views of Charron and
Montaigne).
260
261
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for society [appetitus societatis], that is, for community with those
who belong to his species—though not a community of any kind,
but one at peace, and with a rational order [pro sui intellectus modo
ordinatae].”265 He continued, “Therefore, when it is said that nature
drives each animal to seek its own interests [utilitates], we can say
that this is true of the other animals, and of man before he came to
the use of that which is special to man.”266
As the following quotation indicates, this is quite different from
the argument in The Law of Prize. Instead of reasoning directly
from self-interest, Grotius turned right away to sociability and
identified it—not self-interest—as the source of natural law:
This care for society in accordance with the human intellect,
which we have roughly sketched, is the source of ius,
properly so called, to which belong abstaining from
another’s possessions, restoring anything which belongs to
another (or the profit from it), being obliged to keep
promises, giving compensation for culpable damage, and
incurring human punishment.267
Whether or not the account of sociability in The Rights of War
and Peace is objectively robust, it is certainly broader than it was in
The Law of Prize, and self-interest plays a less important role.
For the second edition, Grotius edited the Prolegomena into the
form that is familiar to readers today. He altered the discussion of
human pursuit of self-interest by deleting the passage that
humans, as animals, seek their own self-interest and inserting the
following: “Therefore the Saying, that every Creature is led by
Nature to seek its own private Advantage, expressed thus
universally, must not be granted.”268 In this version, although he

265 Grotius, Prolegomena to the First Edition of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, in 3
GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 1747. Translations of
passages from the first edition of the Prolegomena are by Richard Tuck. All other
translations are from the 1738 English translation of Jean Barbeyrac’s French
edition. See source cited supra note 17.
266 Grotius, Prolegomena to the First Edition of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, supra note
265, at 1747.
267 Id. at 1747–48.
268 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 81. See also id. at
84–85 (adding additional distinctions between humans and other animals). For a
discussion of these changes, see Tuck, supra note 17, at xxv, and supra text
accompanying notes 235–36.
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admits that humans are animals, the stress is on the difference
between humans and other animals and on the denial that pursuit
of self-interest is a universal truth.269 In The Law of Prize, by
contrast, the affirmation of self-interest led directly to the two most
important laws of nature.270
Grotius also softened the claim in the first edition that
sociability as a source of natural rights would be true “even if we
were to suppose (what we cannot suppose without the greatest
wickedness) that there is no God, or that human affairs are of no
concern to him. ”271 Even in the first edition, Grotius had followed
this passage with a discussion of how God’s will “gives rise to
another ius in addition to that of nature,” which “our reason
[intellectus] irrefutably tells us . . . we should submit to.”272 He also
wrote that the law of nature does not only “derive[] from the
intrinsic principles of a human being [ex principiis homini internis
necessario profluit], it can also justly be attributed to God, since he
willed that there should be such principles in us.”273
In the second edition, Grotius went on at greater length to
explain:
[T]hat God by the Laws which he has given, has made these
very Principles more clear and evident, even to those who
are less capable of strict Reasoning, and has forbid us to
give way to those impetuous Passions, which, contrary to
our own Interest, and that of others, divert us from
following the Rules of Reason and Nature.274
But, if the original discussion was theologically controversial,
the clarification does not seem to help, for it ends up

See generally 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17.
See generally GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 119.
271 Grotius, Prolegomena to the First Edition of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, supra note
17, at 1748. See also supra note 62 and accompanying text (providing contrasting
views on whether Grotius grounded his philosophy of international law in
secularism).
272 Grotius, Prolegomena to the First Edition of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, supra note
265, at 1748.
273 Id. at 1749.
274 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 91–92 (footnotes
omitted).
269
270
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underscoring—in line with Mary Ellen O’Connell’s claim275—that
the basis for natural law is really in reason, that it is against selfinterest to give in to passion, and that God is there to help people
control their passions, so that they can reason, which accords with
their self-interest.
Grotius returned to these issues in Chapter 1, and further
complicated his position, when he adopted Aristotle’s distinction
between natural and voluntary rights and went on to say:
Natural Right is the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason,
shewing the Moral Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in
any Act, according to its Suitableness or Unsuitableness to a
reasonable Nature, and consequently, that such an Act is
either forbid or commanded by GOD, the Author of
Nature.276
As such, a natural right is distinct both from human right and
voluntary divine right. Natural rights exist where actions “are in
themselves, or in their own Nature, Obligatory and Unlawful”—as
opposed to making things unlawful through the act of forbidding
or commanding.277 Further, the law of nature can apply to “Things
which are consequent to some Act of [human] Will.”278 Grotius
explained that humans created property, but once created, under
the law of nature “it is a wicked Thing to take away from any Man,
against his Will, what is properly his own.”279 And then, Grotius
asserted that “the Law of Nature is so unalterable, that God
himself cannot change it.”280 Natural law, in short, would exist
even if there were no God; and if there is a God, he cannot change
natural law.
Grotius said more in both editions of the Prolegomena on the
relationship between sociability and self-interest. The first law of

275 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (citing O’Connell’s opinion
that Grotius opened the door to secular accounts of international law).
276 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 150–51 (footnotes
omitted).
277 Id. at 151–53.
278 Id. at 154.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 155 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 190 (“But let none here object,
that the Law of Nature being unchangeable, GOD himself cannot decree any
Thing against it . . . .”).
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nature that he identifies is “the fulfilling of Covenants,” and it is
the wellspring of civil law.281 He went on to state that:
those who had incorporated themselves into any Society . . .
had either expressly, or from the Nature of the Thing must
be understood to have tacitly promised, that they would
submit to whatever either the greater part of the Society, or
those on whom the Sovereign Power had been conferred,
had ordained.282
The point here is that the natural desire for society leads to the rule
about enforcing covenants, which leads to civil law. And, too, this
is another example of the law of nature applying to “Things which
are consequent to some Act of that Will.”283
Fulfilling covenants is not the most important law of nature,284
but by mentioning it first Grotius was able to return quite quickly
from sociability to self-interest “to the Law of Nature Profit [utility,
in Tuck’s translation] is annexed.”285 Because individual humans
are weak and need many things, they are more willing to enter into
society—and this provides a different basis for civil law: “Whereas
of the Civil Law Profit was the Occasion; for that entering into
Society . . . began first for the Sake of some Advantage. And
besides, those who prescribe Laws to others, usually have, or
ought to have, Regard to some Profit therein.”286 Civil law—
meaning municipal or national law—thus has a basis in the law of
nature, but it also has a basis in self-interest. Moreover, Grotius
indicates that the desire for profit is God-given, because it will lead
humans to do what God wants them to do: enter into society.287
The valorization of covenants also has important implications
for other rights. Grotius’s stress on contracts elevated personal
autonomy, but it did so at the expense of other rights. It is a fair
reading of Grotius that all rights are alienable, as evidenced by his
Id. at 93.
Id.
283 Id. at 154.
284 See infra note 307 and accompanying text (citing Grotius’s views on the
duties of individuals under natural law).
285 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 93.
286 Id. at 94 (footnote omitted).
287 See id. at 93–94 (explaining that, although men are interested in profiting
themselves, the law also is concerned with advantage to the entire body of men).
281
282
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arguments that people can sell themselves into slavery or agree to
be governed by an absolute ruler.288 Still, other passages in The
Rights of War and Peace indicate that some limits exist on the ability
to alienate one’s rights and also, as Lauterpacht recognized, create
small spaces for resistance to oppressive governments.289
Grotius’s next topic in the Prolegomena was the law of nations,
and his discussion revealed the same interplay between justice or
sociability, and self-interest. He noted that:
[just] as the Laws of each State respect the Benefit of that
State; so amongst all or most States there might be, and in
Fact there are, some Laws agreed on by common Consent,
which respect the Advantage not of one Body in particular,
but of all in general. And this is what is called the Law of
Nations . . . .290
Here, the idea of advantage allows a transition from a narrow idea
of benefit to a broader one, which he then equates with justice.291
Yet Grotius also links the law of nations to a more parochial
idea of advantage or benefit. A citizen obeys the laws of his
country even if it means giving up some immediate benefit,
because he knows that failure to do so “saps the Foundation of his
own perpetual Interest, and at the same Time that of his
Posterity.”292 The same is true for nations: “People which violate
the Laws of Nature and Nations, break down the Bulwarks of their
future Happiness and Tranquility.”293 But then Grotius turns again
from interest to justice: “But besides, though there were no Profit
to be expected from the Observation of Right, yet it would be a
Point of Wisdom, not of Folly, to obey the Impulse and Direction of
288 Id. at 261. See also HARRISON, supra note 35, at 148–50 (discussing this
reading of Grotius).
289 See Capps, supra note 17, at 75–77 (describing Grotius’s views that
although people incorporate themselves into society and alienate some natural
rights, there are some circumstances where resistance is justified); HARRISON,
supra note 35, at 151–52 (stating that Grotius focuses on the “actual agreement”
and people’s intentions in limiting agreements). Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition,
supra note 9, at 45-46.
290 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 94.
291 See id. at 94–95 (explaining people and nations will sometimes have to
“pass by” individual benefits and advantages in favor of respect and reverence for
the law, which will, in turn, also secure their long term advantage).
292 Id. at 95.
293 Id.
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our own Nature” – presumably our natural inclination toward
sociability.294 Left unclear is whether justice plays the same role in
this discussion as God does in the discussion of sociability.
Finally, Grotius makes a curious argument. He repeats that
“Right has not Interest merely for its End.”295 And then he
provides the following explanation, in the context of the law of
nations:
[T]here is no State so strong or well provided, but what
may sometimes stand in need of Foreign Assistance, either
in the Business of Commerce, or to repel the joint Forces of
several Foreign Nations Confederate against it. For which
Reason we see Alliances desired by the most powerful
Nations and Princes, the whole Force of which is destroyed
by those that confine Right within the Limits of each State.
So true is it, that the Moment we recede from Right, we can
depend upon nothing.296
This passage begins and ends with language that supports the
idea that Grotius wanted to undermine self-interest as a basis for
international society. Yet the actual explanation is quite different,
for the argument essentially is that, because no one can go it alone,
nations create alliances out of self-interest. Yes, they may forego
temporary advantages, but they realize that their long-term
advantage requires some amount of cooperation. In other words,
ideas of right and justice—and the law of nations in general—have
utility because they assist self-preservation. Still, Grotius tried to
be clear that his focus was on rights and law, not on “Rules about
what it may be profitable or advantageous for us to do”—a topic
that “properly belong[s] to the Art of Politicks.”297
We get some sense of how Grotius meant to go beyond selfinterest as a basis for the law of nations when he mentions war.
Contrary to Lauterpacht, Grotius was not a pacifist, and he did not
hate war. He certainly desired peace, but he clearly states in The
Rights of War and Peace that “every Kind of War is not to be
condemned. History, and the Laws and Customs of all People,
Id.
Id. at 97.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 131. Grotius was distinguishing his work from that of, for example,
Bodin and Machiavelli.
294
295
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fully inform us, that War is not disallowed of by the Voluntary
Law of Nations.”298 Grotius was most concerned about the reasons
for war, and the ways in which wars were carried out. Thus, he
denied “that the Obligation of all Right ceases in War . . . [O]n the
contrary, no War ought to be so much as undertaken but for the
obtaining of Right; nor when undertaken, ought it to be carried on
beyond the Bounds of Justice and Fidelity.”299 Indeed, “War is
made against those who cannot be restrained in a judicial Way.”300
Far from being the ultimate opportunity to pursue self-interest,
war—in Grotius’s account—is appropriate only when it is a
method of enforcing a legal right that cannot be enforced through
less drastic means (and Grotius uses this initial discussion to
explain why he is writing his treatise, which, of course, goes on to
say much more about just or lawful reasons for war and lawful
means of carrying out a war). There is some tension between these
passages and Grotius’s earlier discussion of war in The Law of Prize.
But, in both works, war is legitimate and perhaps even desirable
when a right is at stake—and the rights that justify war include
interference with commerce. Further, as Lauterpacht recognized,
Grotius did not develop clear natural law or law of nations rules
against slaughter or destruction of property in war. Rather, “[i]n
general, by the law of nations anything is permissible as against an
enemy.”301
After his initial discussion of war, Grotius returned to natural
law, and to the differences among Christian morality, the law of
nature, and the law of nations. First, on the place of Christian
morality, “in that most holy Law a greater Sanctity is enjoined us,
than the meer Law of Nature in itself requires,” and Grotius stated
that he would nonetheless discuss in his treatise what is “rather
recommended to us than commanded,” not because of legal
obligation but “so to aim at the highest Perfection.”302

Id. at 189.
Id. at 101. See also 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at
393 (“There is no other reasonable Cause of making War, but an Injury received . . .
.”).
300 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 101.
301 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 12.
302 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 126 (footnote
omitted).
298
299
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Second, on the differences between natural law and the law of
nations, Grotius seems to have believed that the law of nations
overlapped with natural law.303 But they were not co-extensive:
[W]hen many Men of different Times and Places
unanimously affirm the same Thing for Truth, this ought to
be ascribed to a general Cause; which in the Questions
treated of by us, can be no other than either a just Inference
drawn from the Principles of Nature, or an universal
Consent. The former shews the Law of Nature, the other
the Law of Nations.304
Note, though, that Grotius also adopted a more practical approach
to determining the law of nature. In addition to proving it by
“shewing the necessary Fitness or Unfitness of any Thing,” one can
also “with very great Probability, conclude that to be by the Law of
Nature, which is generally believed to be so by all, or at least, the
most civilized, Nations.”305 With this less precise method of
determining natural law, the difference between it and the law of
nations narrows, for it comes down to the difference between
general belief about the content of the natural law that applies to
all and general consent about what laws apply to all.
For all that, the content of the law of nature—which also gives
some content to the law of nations—is not a series of ethical rules.
Remember that Grotius has already distinguished between
Christian morality and the law of nature.306 The “first Duty of
every one [imposed by natural law is] to preserve himself in his
natural State, to seek after those Things which are agreeable to
Nature, and to avert those which are repugnant.”307 Although the
language is more subtle, this is very similar to the first two laws of
nature in The Law of Prize—the rights to defend oneself, avoid
injurious things, and acquire and retain useful things.308 And all of
this equates to a natural law foundation that validates a significant
Id. at 163.
Id. at 112 (footnote omitted).
305 Id. at 159. See also id. at 161 (agreeing that “[s]ome People are savage and
brutish, whose Manners cannot, with Truth and Justice, be reckoned a Reproach
to human Nature in general”) (footnote omitted).
306 Grotius also insisted Mosaic law is not the law of nature. See id. at 166–76.
307 Id. at 180.
308 See supra Section 3.1.2 (discussing The Law of Prize).
303
304
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amount of self-interest. The second law of nature is roughly
equivalent to the third and fourth laws in The Law of Prize, and it
placed some limits on self-interest: the law of nature prohibits
“Violence . . . which is repugnant to Society, that is, which invades
another’s Right.”309 Grotius added to the law of nature throughout
the book, but he was at pains to deny that many of the obligations
of one kind or another that he discussed rose to the level of natural
law.310
The law of nations was also not as robust as it might first
appear. Even when it addressed a particular issue, Grotius insisted
on the distinction between two forms of the law of nations. The
distinction was:
between that which is truly and in every Respect lawful,
and that which only produces a certain external Effect after
the Manner of that primitive Law; so that, for Instance, it
may be lawful to resist it, or that it even ought to be every
where defended with the publick Force, for the Sake of
some Advantage that attends it, or that some great
Inconveniences may be avoided.311
Importantly, too, the distinction between civilized and
uncivilized for purposes of discovering natural law almost
certainly carried through to the law of nations. On the one hand,
the idea of broad or universal consent was both important and
required a degree of formality, for Grotius faulted earlier writers,
who “often call that the Law of Nations, which prevails among
some Nations only, and that not by a sort of tacit Agreement, but
by Imitation of one another, or even by a casual Consent.”312 On
the other hand, the idea of universal consent was also an
exaggeration, for Grotius later referred to “the Right of Nations,
which derives its Authority from the Will of all, or at least of many,
Nations.”313 It seems fair to assume that the “many nations” whose
Id. at 184 (footnote omitted).
See HARRISON, supra note 35, at 157 (discussing Grotius’s distinction
between the minimal obligations of natural law and the recommendations of
religious doctrine, such as the ten Commandments).
311 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 113.
312 Id. at 129–30.
313 Id. at 162–63 (footnotes omitted). Grotius appears to suggest the law of
nations could be different in different parts of the world: “there is scarce[ly] any
Right found, except that of Nature, which is also called the Right of Nations,
309
310
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consent is required for the law of nations would overlap with the
“civilized nations” whose beliefs are relevant to the content of
natural law. If that is true, then the Grotian system of international
law is not merely colonial or imperial because of how it was
used—as Keene has argued—but also in its foundations.
It is also imperial in its specific rules. For example, Grotius
considered whether one country “may contract with another, to
purchase all the Commodities of a particular Kind, which are the
Produce of that Country only.”314 In general, he thought that such
contracts were lawful. But he also took care to raise a variation on
the problem:
[I]n Matter of mere Profit, one may lawfully prevent
another, especially if there be any particular Reason for it,
as when a Nation has taken under their Protection the
People with whom they make such a Contract, and are
therefore obliged to be at an extraordinary Expence. This
Sort of Monopoly, practised in the Manner, and with the
Intention I observed, is no Ways repugnant to the Law of
Nature . . . .315
My sketch of Grotius’s life suggests that this passage relates
directly to the disputes between the English and Dutch over trade
in the East Indies. But in the course of affirming Dutch conduct,
Grotius also assumes that the law of nature—and therefore also the
law of nations—allows a country to place the people of another
country “under [its] Protection,” and to do so in the course of an
ostensibly commercial relationship.316
Grotius’s discussion of property and treaties deepens the utility
of his treatise for imperial expansion. He has a long discussion of
how a person can lose property rights or sovereignty by
prescription as well as by agreement, for example by inaction or
tacit consent in another person’s—or another sovereign’s—exercise

common to all Nations. Nay, that which is reputed the Right or Law of Nations in
one Part of the World, is not so in another . . . .” Id. at 163. Of course, “reputed” is
not the same as “established.”
314 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 452. See also supra
note 195 and accompanying text (offering sources discussing free trade and
exclusive treaties amongst nations).
315 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 453.
316 Id.
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of dominion.317 Exactly what constitutes inaction or tacit consent
remains elusive. Further, although “a Sovereignty may have been
originally acquired by Force; yet it may become lawful by a tacit
Will, which confirms the Enjoyment of it to the Possessor.”318 And
again, the exact way in which this tacit will is expressed remains
unclear, although Grotius indicates that failure to fight for one’s
property or sovereignty, or even failure to win if one does fight,
may be sufficient.319
As for treaties, Grotius affirms that Christian countries can
make treaties with non-Christians, for as in The Law of Prize, “the
Right of making Alliances is common to all Men.”320 Further, the
right to make treaties includes the right to make unequal treaties,
including unequal treaties that “lessen . . . the sovereign
Jurisdiction of the inferior Power.”321 On the one hand, it is hard to
imagine a practical system in which disparities of power would
easily invalidate treaties and contracts. On the other hand, the
combination of the right to contract with non-Christians, and the
right of non-Christians to enter into treaties as inferior partners—
and to give up some or all of their sovereignty along the way—
provides a firm framework for European expansion. Once again
taking Grotius’s experience and earlier writings into account, it is
difficult to reach any conclusion other than that he intended just
such a result.322

317 See id. at 487–500 (describing how actions and silence can also lead to loss
of rights or property and further addressing the rights of royalty and those
unborn).
318 Id. at 503.
319 See id. at 503–04 (recounting King Agrippa’s speech to the Jews after
conquering their land and depriving them of liberty, which apparently included
the assertion, “It is now too late to aim at Liberty. It was formerly your Duty to
have fought for Defence of it. . . . But he who, once vanquished, revolts, is not to
be called a Lover of Liberty”).
320 Id. at 827–28.
321 Id. at 826.
322 Keene discusses the colonial/imperial implications of two additional
topics: Grotius’s writings on the right to occupy property and divisible
sovereignty; although he suggests that Grotius did not intend those implications.
See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (citing sources which discuss
divisible sovereignty and European use of Grotius’s writings to seize lands and
property from other people).
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3.3. Summing Up
Grotius was by any estimation a remarkable man. He was
brilliant, diligent, prolific, and committed to a fairly consistent set
of principles that he worked hard to advance throughout his life.
But contrary to Lauterpacht’s claim, Grotius was in no sense a
disinterested scholar. Nor was he a reluctant participant in public
life. He also was not a progressive in any meaningful sense of the
word, unless one assumes that a belief in reason, restraint, and the
importance of law makes one progressive. Certainly, he was not
the anti-Hobbes (although he was still something of an antiMachiavelli).
Instead, Grotius was, first and foremost, an engaged
intellectual and an ambitious man of affairs. In his life and work—
at least through the first two editions of The Rights of War and
Peace—politics, religion, commerce, and international affairs
overlapped and intermingled. They were essential pieces of the
contested past, present, and future of Dutch identity and of the
Dutch Republic.
Grotius was also not a pacifist, although it is fair to say that The
Law of Prize and The Rights of War and Peace exhibit somewhat
different attitudes toward war.323 Contrary to Tuck, Grotius was
not simply laying the groundwork for Dutch aggression in The
Rights of War and Peace, and he was not as sanguine about war as he
once had been. Lauterpacht’s claim of pacifism also goes too far,
but he was responding to Grotius’s real concern about the costs
and carnage of war. Yet for all that concern, Grotius failed to
articulate strong limits on the conduct of war, and war remained
available as a normal remedy for a violation of rights.
Grotius played an important part in articulating the
relationship between natural law and international law, where
natural law influenced the content of international law. But the
details of that relationship and influence are crucial. For example,

323 See DUMBAULD, supra note 111, at 31 (“Resort to war as an equivalent for
judicial process was viewed by the younger Grotius more zestfully than in 1625.
In the Law of War and Peace the author was more disposed to discourage warfare,
and he dwelt with eloquent dismay upon the shameful license and lawlessness
which he beheld throughout the Christian world of his day.”); supra notes 298–301
and accompanying text (describing Grotius’s view that war should only be carried
out under limited reasons, for example when there is no other way to enforce a
legal right).
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although The Rights of War and Peace developed a more robust idea
of sociability than The Law of Prize, there is also a pattern to the
analysis in the Prolegomena. Again and again, Grotius would lead
with sociability but would also rely on self-interest. Although I
disagree with Tuck’s assertion that self-interest was paramount for
Grotius, this pattern suggests an internal tension in Grotius’s
conception of natural law’s foundation. It suggests, among other
things, an openness to realism.324
In addition, even if Grotius expanded his idea of sociability
between The Law of Prize and The Rights of War and Peace, that
conception remained minimalist in comparison with traditional
views of the time. As Tuck explains, for example, “his argument
eschewed the rich and complex Aristotelian account of social life,
with its stress on friendship and on the development of the
virtues.”325 This kind of natural law does not provide an obvious
foundation for a humane or progressive system of international
law (although it can be consistent with and certainly does not
prevent such a system). Nor is it very effective at filling gaps. It
does not provide an “ever-present source for supplementing the
voluntary law of nations, for judging its adequacy in the light of
ethics and reason.”326 Quite the opposite is true. Grotius did not
derive the rules of international law simply from natural law,327
324 In addition, therefore, although I agree with most of Patrick Capps’s
account, see Capps, supra note 17, at 72–74, I do not agree with his analysis of
sociability and interest.
325 Richard Tuck, Grotius and Selden, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT, 1450-1700, at 499, 515–16 (J.H. Burns & Mark Goldie eds., 1991). See also
HARRISON, supra note 35, at 138, 157 (stressing Grotius’s minimalist notion of
natural law); MAY, WAR CRIMES, supra note 71, at 58 (describing Grotius as “a
minimal natural law theorist”).
326 Lauterpacht, Grotian Tradition, supra note 9, at 21–22.
327 Knight argued, “Nations, in his view and expressing contemporary
thought, can be subject to a Law of Nature, and a Law of Nations also, only by
consent. . . . But such Law of Nations by consent would not be the natural Law of
Nations of individuals, but an arbitrary Law of Nations or States. Grotius has
little or no idea of a Natural Law of States.” KNIGHT, supra note 109, at 199. See
also 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE
AGE OF REFORMATION 154 (1978) (“[T]here is no doubt that by the end of the
sixteenth century, due to the progressive refinement of the underlying idea that
the law of nations is simply an aspect of positive human law, the later Jesuit
theorists were able to bequeath to Grotius and his successors a recognisable
analysis of international law as a special code of positive law founded on the
principles of natural justice . . . .”). In his notes on The Rights of War and Peace, Jean
Barbeyrac criticized Grotius for making exactly this distinction. See 1 GROTIUS,
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and he frequently denied that natural law forbade practices that he
admitted were undesirable.
Natural law minimalism also fails to provide much foundation
for robust conceptions of human rights, let alone for liberalism.
Despite his support for some religious toleration and his embrace
of minimal natural human rights and formal individual autonomy
in a state of nature, Grotius was not a proto-liberal. He came
nowhere close to articulating strong conceptions of individual
liberty, civil, or political rights (let alone fundamental rights that
are beyond the reach of state power), or participatory
government.328 Thus, while Grotius’s work can be situated along a
path of analysis or development that ends with contemporary
notions of “the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual,”329 there is little basis for the claim that his work does
much to advance liberal rights beyond autonomy. In both The Law
of Prize and The Rights of War and Peace, moreover, rights function
more to legitimate or condemn violence, than they do to protect
liberty, autonomy, or political freedom.330
The Rights of War and Peace was more than a credential for
diplomatic employment or a manual for oppressive war. It is
mature, reflective, and scholarly. Grotius meant the book to have
immediate usefulness, but he was also reaching for—and
achieved—something, perhaps not of transcendent importance, but
certainly of abiding value. Yet that general goal and achievement
does not bring the book in line with the claims that Grotians make

RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 163 n.3; see also Josef L. Kunz, NaturalLaw Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 951, 952
(1961) (“Grotius distinguished the ‘natural’ and the ‘voluntary’ jus gentium,
although modern international lawyers are sometimes of exactly opposite
opinions as to what part he emphasized.”).
328 See HARRISON, supra note 35, at 149–54 (discussing how Grotius’s system is
consistent with rule by absolute princes and voluntary contracting into slavery);
Tuck, Grotius and Selden, supra note 325, at 519–20 (analyzing a passage written by
Grotius discussing total subordination to princes).
329 Cf. René Brouwer, On the Ancient Background of Grotius’s Notion of Natural
Law, 29 GROTIANA 1, 21 (2008) (“Grotius paved the way for a modern
understanding of human rights.”); van Nifterik, supra note 214, at 17 (suggesting a
concept of “proto-rights” appears in some of Grotius’s writings).
330 Cf. supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text (noting Tuck’s argument
that, for Grotius, “an individual in nature . . . was morally identical to a state” and
that “both may use violence in the same way for the same ends”).
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on its behalf. To the contrary, Grotius’s writings indicate that he
was not really a Grotian, at least as Lauterpacht defined the term.
4.

WHAT TO DO WITH GROTIUS

4.1. Inventing a Tradition
As I stated in the Introduction, the conclusion that Grotius’s life
and work has only a sketchy relationship to the Grotian tradition
indicates that the tradition is “invented.”
Eric Hobsbawm
famously observed that “‘[t]raditions’ which appear or claim to be
old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.”331
The reason for inventing a tradition, according to Hobsbawm, is
not to reflect a potentially authentic engagement with the
complexities of historical inheritances. Rather, it is “ideological,”
not technical or natural.332 The goal of an invented tradition is to
“establish[] or symboliz[e] social cohesion or the membership of
groups.”333 It achieves this goal by “inculcat[ing] certain values
and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies
continuity with the past”—even though “insofar as there is such
reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of ‘invented’ traditions
is that the continuity with it is largely factitious.”334 Further,
Hobsbawm contends, to achieve the inculcation of values and
norms, traditions must have “[t]he object and characteristic of . . .
invariance.”335
Hobsbawm asserts that invented traditions are almost
commonplace. But, he also suggests a pattern in their invention:
[Invention will] occur more frequently when a rapid
transformation of society weakens or destroys the social
patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed,
producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or
when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and

331 Hobsbawm, supra note 25, at 1. I use Hobsbawm’s analysis to interpret
repeated symbolic invocations of an intellectual continuity, which take on a
ritualistic quality, as opposed to dealing directly with rituals or symbols, which is
Hobsbawm’s focus.
332 Id. at 3.
333 Id. at 9.
334 Id. at 1–2.
335 Id. at 2.
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promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and
flexible, or are otherwise eliminated . . . .336
Thus, Hobsbawm observes that “one period which saw
[invented traditions] spring up with particular assiduity was in the
thirty or forty years before the first world war.”337 He explains that
in those years,
[q]uite new, or old but dramatically transformed, social
groups, environments and social contexts called for new
devices to ensure or express social cohesion and identity
and to structure social relations. At the same time a
changing society made the traditional forms of ruling by
states and social or political hierarchies more difficult or
even impracticable.338
Peter Brooks approaches the question of invented traditions,
and their importance during the same period, from another
direction. He contends that “[f]rom sometime in the mideighteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, Western
societies appear to have felt an extraordinary need or desire for
plots, whether in fiction, history, philosophy, or any of the social
sciences.”339 He attributes this transition to the influence of the
Enlightenment and Romanticism, and he suggests that the rise of
narrative reflected the decline of theology and the rise of history
“as the key discourse and central imagination.”340 That is to say,
“the plotting of the individual or social or institutional life story
takes on new urgency when one no longer can look to a sacred
masterplot that organizes and explains the world.”341
The idea of the invented tradition has considerable explanatory
force for the assertion of a Grotian tradition. Grotius wrote at a

Id. at 4–5.
Eric Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914, in THE
INVENTION OF TRADITION, supra note 25, at 263.
338 Id. Here, Hobsbawm is again emphasizing the role of invented traditions
in shaping and reflecting national life. Id. at 263–64. Still, he also notes the
creation of traditions, such as May Day, among “organized mass movements
claiming separate or even alternative status to states.” Id. at 283.
339 PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND INVENTION IN NARRATIVE
5 (1984).
340 Id. at 6.
341 Id.
336
337
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time of disruption, one in which historical and political narratives
were increasingly important in a Europe that was divided along
religious lines. His early work provided such narratives for the
Dutch Republic, and one easily can interpret The Rights of War and
Peace—particularly because of its intense engagement with earlier
writers and historical sources—as doing the same for international
law. Later commentators who see Grotius as the founder of
international law or the theoretical architect of the Peace of
Westphalia essentially treat the book in this way. For similar
reasons, his work became extremely useful to writers such as
Lauterpacht at an analogous moment: the early and mid-twentieth
century.342
In the Introduction, I suggested that inventing a Grotian
tradition—a grand narrative about an international legal system—
served at least three goals. First is the post-World War II effort to
remake the international system. Second is the desire to provide a
historically-situated theoretical foundation for the ideas that
arguably undergird that system. Third is the utility of “purifying”
Grotius’s ideas so as to be able to claim that he provides the
necessary theoretical foundation for the post-War order. Properly
understood—that is, understood within the rubric of the Grotian
tradition—international law has always forwarded pacifism,
human rights, and an international rule of law as much or more
than it has accommodated a system of independent nation-states
that pursue their own interests. One could also add a fourth, and
not necessarily least important, goal: the tradition also supports
the displacement of politicians and diplomats and suggests the
centrality of publicists, scholars, and judges to the project of
international law.343

342 Arno Mayer famously and convincingly asserted that the First and Second
World Wars “were nothing less than the Thirty Years’ War of the general crisis of
the twentieth century.” ARNO J. MAYER, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE OLD REGIME:
EUROPE TO THE GREAT WAR 3 (Verso 2010) (1981).
343 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Function of Law in the International Community:
Introduction, in LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW, supra note 5, at xxix, xlvii
(“Hersch Lauterpacht was committed to the belief that international lawyers, in
particular international judges, should rule the world.”).
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4.2. Reverse Engineering? Surveying the Options
The utility of the Grotian tradition for these goals, and for
liberal approaches to international law in general, is fairly obvious.
But narratives that take the place of “sacred masterplots”344 are
unstable. And historical narratives always leaves something out.
So it is with the Grotian tradition. If one takes account of the
absences, what happens to the tradition?
4.2.1. Nothing
The first possibility is that nothing happens. Invented
traditions, as selective narratives, always exist in the face of “facts.”
Belief in or agreement with a tradition provides an attractive
baseline for assessing and dismissing attacks on that tradition. So,
for example, it may be that Grotius had a legal and political career,
and that he served various state and private interests. But, the
defenders of the tradition might say, when he had the chance to do
his own work, he produced The Rights of War and Peace. Further,
although he had to bow in the direction of practical realities when
he wrote that book, he deliberately constructed a system that was
built for progress along various recognizable paths.
Certainly, there is much that is normatively attractive about the
goals packed into the Grotian tradition, and there is a longstanding
tradition of advocating for pacifism, human rights, and limited
national sovereignty as critical components of international law.
But these things just do not have very much to do with the
historical figure of Grotius or much of his writing. Even more, the
insistence on a tradition, on direct and foundational links to the
past, could undermine these goals (as, for example, when others go
back to what Grotius really wrote and use those words to
reinterpret the tradition in different directions).
And finally, international law has developed in ways that
arguably leave the Grotian tradition behind. Martti Koskenniemi
has asserted:
Today, few experts conceive of themselves as part of the
Lauterpacht tradition of a public law oriented global
federalism. Instead, they may work for private or publicprivate institutions, national administrations, interest
344

BROOKS, supra note 339, at 6.
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groups or technical bodies, developing best practices and
standardised solutions . . . as part of the management of
particular regimes.345
He concludes that “the ‘international’ is no longer a meaningful
space for progressive politics” and that “the internationalism of
Lauterpacht and his generation is no longer plausible.”346
All of this is simply to say that doing nothing not only requires
ignoring counter-narratives and the possibilities that they might
produce but also may not even advance the underlying goals of the
Grotian tradition itself. Doing nothing also ducks the question
whether those goals have much purchase in the contemporary
international law practice that Koskenniemi describes.
4.2.2. Abandon Grotius to History
Grotius led an interesting life during a tumultuous period in
western European history. He wrote extensively about important
issues of the day. As such, his life and work are important parts of
European diplomatic and intellectual history.
He remains
relevant—not as an authority, but rather to the sorts of questions
and puzzles that occupy intellectual historians and historians of
diplomacy, jurisprudence, and philosophy. One could go further
and say, as I did in the Introduction, that Grotius is also an apt
representative, for better and for worse, of the formative period of
international law as a European (and therefore also colonial)
project—a period that arguably encompasses, at its outer reaches,
the founding of the United States.
Thus, he could have
contemporary legal and political relevance for those who want to
articulate the intellectual life of that period for the purpose of
arguing that it provides meaning to, for example, the U.S.
Constitution—although he would share the stage with other

345 Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique
and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007).
346 Id. at 28. See also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 613 (2d ed. 2005) (“[I]t does not
seem possible [anymore] to believe that international law is automatically or
necessarily an instrument of progress.”). But cf. FLEUR JOHNS, NON-LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNRULY LAW 21 (2013) (rejecting the idea of “decline” “[t]o
the extent that it may be extracted from Koskenniemi’s work” on the rise of
managerialism).
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figures.347 In this account, there is no tradition, no contemporary
doctrinal significance. There is simply history.
4.2.3. Recognize Grotius as a Transitional Figure
If Grotius can be seen as representative of his legal times, then
the next option is to take a small step back toward the idea of a
tradition. Many scholars have attempted to identify periods in
international legal theory, often as part of an effort to define what
is modern. David Kennedy, for example, has identified primitive
(pre–1648), traditional (1648–1900), and modern (1900–1980)
periods in western international legal theory,348 and he assigns
Grotius to the primitive category. The category describes not
simply a span of years but also a characteristic way of thinking
about international law.
According to Kennedy, primitive
international legal theory includes not only an “evident faith in a
universal moral order,”349 but also an eclectic approach to legal
authorities that can appear “incoherent and diffuse,” even as
specific doctrines link up “unproblematically” with “authoritative
propositions.”350
To some extent, Grotius exhibits these qualities. Yet Kennedy
also notes that some commentators think of Grotius as
“foreshadow[ing] ‘modern’ international legal scholarship.”351
And Kennedy goes on to suggest that the traditional approach
“sprang from the ruins of primitive scholarship—ruins stemming
from the fragile tensions of Grotius and his difficulty in
maintaining the assumption of social order which his primitive

347 For an interesting and useful recent discussion of founding-era
engagement with international legal theory, and twentieth-century
mythologization of that engagement, see generally Brian Richardson, The Use of
Vattel in the American Law of Nations, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 547 (2012).
348 David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2–3
(1986). See also KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 346, at 95 (describing Grotius’s work as
an example of “early” international law scholarship, a “discourse which shares
the pre-liberal assumption of an objective, universally binding code which preexists the human being but is graspable by him through faith or recta ratio”).
349 Kennedy, supra note 348, at 95. See also id. at 6 (“The distinctive style and
method of primitive texts suggest a more uniform faith in universal principles
than does the methodological argument of traditional work.”).
350 Id. at 6. See also id. at 96 (“[T]he primitive lexicon parodies our eclectic
confidence . . . .”).
351 Id. at 77.
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mode of discourse demands.”352 Without entering too deeply into
the debate, it is worth considering whether the fight over Grotius’s
place indicates that he does not fit neatly into one group or
another, not because he is a late primitive, but because he is a
transitional figure, perhaps even a bridge or gateway from an older
style of thinking to one that is more recognizable—even if not
particularly similar—to contemporary approaches.
Put differently, one could argue that Grotius is important for
his place on the cusp, which required him to draw on existing
patterns of thought while also reaching, unsteadily and perhaps
even blindly, for another form of expression. He looked forward
and backward at the same time.353 As such, he arguably
“initiate[d] a dialogue” with future writers.354 Perhaps, too, he
helped to set the stage for liberalism and enlightenment thinking
even if neither he nor his writings were themselves liberal.355
But the point of this possible approach to Grotius is not to relink him to the Grotian tradition. As someone who looked forward
and backward, his commitments, methods, and conclusions would
be inherently ambiguous. He would open up questions without
resolving them, without always knowing that he was opening
them, and would not necessarily reach—and perhaps not even
suggest—conclusions that later writers would embrace. This
version of Grotius has affinities with Falk’s view, but without the
charged resonance of Grotius as an example or model. One could
accept this approach, for example, while also maintaining that
Grotius’s importance is primarily historical.

Id. at 97.
Cf. Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 257, 332 (1990) (developing the idea of the “paradigm-seeking case” that
“looks to the past, while allowing for growth and change in the future”).
354 Id. (arguing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877), “is Janus faced” because “[i]t looks to the past, while allowing for
growth and change in the future. Pennoyer [thus] initiates a dialogue with future
courts . . . .”).
355 To the extent this is a plausible suggestion, it runs into O’Connell’s
concern that Grotius’s mixing of religious and secular foundations for natural law
“contained the seeds of the ultimate challenge to the Grotian world view.”
O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 32.
352
353
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4.2.4. Grotius as Distant Architect
Another option is to see Grotius as the forerunner of the
contemporary treaty-based structure of international law.
Although The Rights of War and Peace focuses on international law
rules derived from reason and the law of nature, Grotius’s concern
for commerce and his stress on the need to keep promises ensured
that treaties play a critical role in his scheme. Further, alongside
his claims about the importance of treaties, Grotius also conceived
of sovereignty as divisible, and he explicitly stated that treaties
could dilute a country’s sovereignty (albeit often through unequal
treaties).356
All of this is important to contemporary international law,
because, for example, the multiple and overlapping international
conventions drafted since World War II use the assumption of
compliance to create a system of diluted sovereignty. In this sense,
contemporary international law arguably does rest on a Grotian
foundation. Of course, the problem of unequal treaties persists in
this system, for powerful countries have greater control over the
content of treaty terms, and weaker countries face pressure to sign
such treaties in order to be full members of the international
community. With respect to human rights treaties in particular,
this dynamic has led to charges of cultural and legal imperialism.
To the extent those charges hit home, they mirror the effects of the
legal system that Grotius fostered in his own day.
Importantly, with this possibility, my claim is neither that
Grotius intended any of the contemporary structure nor that there
is anything necessarily wrong with that structure.357 If he is an
architect, he is similar to an early member of a shifting team whose
work culminates over centuries in the construction of a building
that might differ greatly from its original plans. That is to say, this
claim is ultimately historical as well. Perhaps Grotius’s ideas
helped lay the foundation for the contemporary international
system, but that does not mean they have any further
contemporary resonance beyond that fact.

356 1 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 305–35; 2 GROTIUS,
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 17, at 826.
357 Note that, unlike Kant, Grotius did not look forward to a federation of
states. For Kant’s argument in favor of a “federation of free states,” see Kant,
supra note 93, at 102–05.
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4.2.5. Grotius as International Lawyer?
The last possibility that I will discuss is to see Grotius as a
foundational figure for contemporary international legal practice.
Grotius, one might argue, symbolizes a method that is constantly
attentive to law as an act of interpretation and to the tensions
between pragmatic and normative arguments. In this view,
Grotius’s eclectic use of sources, historical and scholarly, does not
represent primitivism. Combined with his minimalist conception
of natural law, Grotius’s method exemplifies a lawyerly
willingness to use the materials at hand to construct arguments
about what the law is or could be, with few claims about
overarching moral law, while also holding skepticism at arm’s
length. Indeed, seen from this perspective, the Grotian tradition
betrays an anxiety about foundations that leads it to reject the
creative engagement—the mix of pragmatism and commitment, of
idealism tempered by realism—that characterized Grotius himself.
By rejecting the Grotian tradition, one might argue, we could reembrace a different image of Grotius as a flawed but still worthy
example for contemporary international theorists and lawyers.
This approach fits neatly with the uncomfortable realities of
international law. Although enforcement structures exist for
international law, it remains true that much of international law
rests on persuasion and voluntary compliance.358
And
international law frequently validates positions that frustrate
activists and reformers.359 The international lawyer (or perhaps at
least the non-managerial international lawyer) must constantly
argue, must constantly adjust the relationship between ideals and
possibilities. He or she must also accept that the resulting
distances between goals and arguments, and between arguments
and achievements, are a defining aspect of international legal
practice and professionalism. Grotius can be interpreted as a
powerful prototype for this stance. Importantly, though, the kind
of distance or detachment that a self-consciously interpretive role
requires is not the normative detachment of realism; it is precisely
a professional detachment that reflects a disciplined commitment to
358 For an excellent discussion of enforcement in international law, see
generally O’CONNELL, supra note 1.
359 See, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 346, at 615 (“[I]nternational law is always
already complicit in the actual system of distribution of material and spiritual
values in the world.”).
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the discourse and possibilities of international law over time in
addition to acceptance of the realities of international legal
practice.
Koskenniemi’s “culture of formalism” helps illuminate the
approach that I am trying to articulate. According to Koskenniemi,
The culture of formalism . . . may be characterized in a
familiar way as a practice that builds on formal arguments
that are available to all under conditions of equality. It
seeks to persuade the protagonists (lawyers, decisionmakers) to take a momentary distance from their
preferences and to enter a terrain where these preferences
should be justified, instead of taken for granted, by
reference to standards that are independent from their
particular positions or interests.360
Koskenniemi recognizes that this is not a neutral position. He
suggests, at the risk of “banality,” that the culture of formalism
advances the following views:
[T]hat there must be limits to the exercise of power, . . . that
those who are weak must be heard and protected, and that
when professional men and women engage in an argument
about what is lawful and what is not, they are engaged in a
politics that imagines the possibility of a community
overriding particular alliances and preferences and
allowing a meaningful distinction between lawful
constraint and the application of naked power.361
Finally, Koskenniemi recognizes the dangers of his claim. He
insists his is a post-critical perspective, that it does not require
particular substantive outcomes or commitments “whether
imperial or particular” and that it “represents the possibility of the
universal . . . by remaining ‘empty,’ a negative instead of a positive
datum, and thus avoids the danger of imperialism.”362
At the risk of over-simplifying, Koskenniemi suggests the
possibility of a discourse that insists on the value of legal claims
and arguments and is not satisfied merely with preferred
outcomes. Even more, this discourse has to be critical even as it
360
361
362

KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 68, at 501.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 504.
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affirms a minimalist commitment to inclusion and to opposing
“naked power.”363 The rights or claims at issue have little fixed
content, and the boundaries of argument remain open to debate.364
In some sense, it is argument that goes nearly all the way down,
where the focus is on reasons as much or more as on outcomes.
The position I am sketching is not identical to Koskenniemi’s
vision.
Koskenniemi comes closer to an anti-foundational
approach to law (if one agrees that the stance in favor of inclusion
and against naked power is critical and structural rather than
substantive).365 But if the point is to find a place for Grotius, then
there must be something more than inclusion and opposition to
“naked power,” albeit something still minimalist. If Grotius
supports an interpretive approach to law, it is one that exists in
relation to external moral rules and in which existing legal rules
and doctrines, and certain types of arguments, would have
assumed weight, even if one remained open to reinterpreting
them. Perhaps it is possible to reduce all of this to a variation of
the Wight/Bull middle path between idealism and realism, but
what I have attempted to outline is something more critically selfconscious,366 even if it shades closer to the status quo than
Koskenniemi might accept.367 Grotius might stand today, in other
words, for an international law that rests on natural law, but on a
d. at 502.
See id. at 508 (“[F]ormalism projects the universal community as a
standard—but always as an unachieved one. . . . Thus every decision process
with an aspiration to inclusiveness must constantly negotiate its own boundaries
as it is challenged by new claims or surrounded by new silences. Yet because it is
unachieved, it can sustain (radical) democracy and political progress, and resist
accepting as universal the claims it has done most to recognize in the past.”).
365 The parenthetical in the text may suggest too much. See Koskenniemi,
supra note 345, at 30 (referring to “international law as a kind of secular faith”:
“When powerful states engage in imperial wars, globalisation dislocates
communities or transnational companies wreck havoc on the environment, and
where national governments show themselves corrupt or ineffective, one often
hears an appeal to international law. International law appears here less as this
rule or that institution than a placeholder for the vocabularies of justice and
goodness, solidarity, responsibility and—faith”).
366 Thus, I am trying to advance a position that goes beyond Kingsbury’s
suggestion that, for many people, “Grotius and Grotianism have come to stand for
both the challenging and the reproduction of . . . ‘ambivalence’ or, in the same
way, for pragmatism or eclecticism.” Kingsbury, supra note 81, at 16.
367 The argument has been made, however, that the culture of formalism
accommodates the status quo. See generally Paavo Kotiaho, A Return to
Koskenniemi, or the Disconcerting Co-optation of Rupture, 13 GERMAN L.J. 483 (2012).
363
364
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natural law that relies more on reason than foundations, that
builds on moral and legal traditions but is open to new language
and different perspectives.
This approach asserts that Grotius is relevant to contemporary
international law practice. But what if—as the other approaches I
sketched suggest—Grotius’s place is simply not important?
Imagining international law without Grotius can be a radical act,
for it easily could symbolize the deliberate unmooring of
international law from tradition and even, as much as possible,
from history and from the valorization of state sovereignty—in
favor of a law that could focus relentlessly on the present and
future.368 This version of international law, in which Grotius—and,
even more, the Grotian tradition—are absent, might unfold within
a culture of formalism or perhaps even within a more radical idea
of law as unbounded interpretation, in which everything is at stake
and everything is in play. Perhaps this last possibility would
discard too much. It is difficult to imagine law as truly
unbounded. And even if Grotius has no necessary place in
international law, good reasons may still exist for ongoing critical
engagement with claims of traditions and foundations.
In the end, I am not trying to chart the course of international
law argument, and I surely have not exhausted the possible
options, with or without Grotius. But deciding what to do with
Grotius—to keep him as a constant reference point for an imagined
past and future of international law, to retain him in a diminished
capacity, or to discard him altogether—is an act that resonates
beyond historical debate. It is also a decision about international
law’s character: its foundations, if any; its substantive
commitments, if any; its responsibility to and for its past, if any;
and its aspirations, again, if any.

368 Of course, many writers have noted that history has a lot to do with who
has power, who can speak, and whose voices count.
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